Militarism 2.0: South China Sea

Chinese destroyer Qingdao enters Pearl Harbor in 2006. The fact that she was able to make this long journey demonstrates the high endurance of Chinese warships.

A specter is haunting Asia – the specter of war. Across the continent, from India to Japan, formerly peaceful countries are pursuing aggressive and occasionally expansionist policies. While expansionism is not new in the region, this time is different. Previous conflicts in Asia tended to feature one modern and well-armed nation conquering smaller and weaker ones, as in the rise of Tang China in the 7th century or Imperial Japan in the 20th century. This time, however, there are several different sides involved in a potential run-up to war. Aggressive statements from political leaders are just the public face of the looming crisis. The region is haunted by nationalism, energy disputes, and, most ominously, an arms race.

Arms Race

Since the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions are defined by the sea, this arms race is primarily naval. Although military spending in Asia grew at a slower rate than usual because of the poor state of the economy, Asian military budgets grew by an average of 2.3 percent in 2011.1 While this may not sound like a very large increase, it is significant because military spending in the rest of the world has hit a plateau, which makes Asia the region with the second biggest increase in military spending, after the Middle East.2 Asia’s military buildup is more visible over the long term, as spending has risen 69 percent since 2000, compared to a global increase of 49 percent.3 This is especially concerning because the U.S. and most of its Western European allies are cutting their defense budgets to rein in rising deficits.4

The two countries largely responsible for this jump in spending are also the world’s largest: India and China. By 2030, India plans to spend $45 billion on its navy and add 103 ships to its fleet; China plans to spend $20 billion and add 135 ships. India is the world’s largest arms importer, accounting for nine percent of all global arms trade.5

   

More important than just the numbers of ships India and China plan to acquire, however, is the types of ships they will build and weapons they are buying. Both countries have explicitly stated a desire to own “blue-water” navies,” (fleets that can fight and project power more than 200 miles from their home countries) and are thus investing in power projection weapons, particularly aircraft carriers. India is currently building two new 40,000 ton carriers, is planning to launch a 65,000 ton carrier by 2017, and has purchased $700 million worth of MiG-29ks (Russian carrier-based fighters).6 China, meanwhile, has just launched its first carrier, a refitted 33,000 ton Gorbachev-era ex-Soviet vessel and plans to build four more.7

 

Carriers are useful for projecting influence and fighting conflicts a long distance away from their bases, which makes them exceptionally well suited to power projection and controlling regions. It is worrying that China and India are expressing increased interest in these vessels, since it shows that they likely intend to establish firm spheres of influence in the region using threats of force.

American and Indian aircraft fly over the Indian aircraft carrier INS Viraat.

India and China are interested in another power projection tool recently: amphibious warfare ships, which can transport Marines and launch D-Day style assaults on beaches. India bought its first amphibious warfare ship, an outdated U.S. Navy vessel, last year and plans to acquire four newer ships,8 and China owns two modern (circa 2006) and domestically built amphibious warfare ships and plans to build eight more.9

   

Both nations are also investing in the crucial yet inconspicuous aspects of power projection: support vessels (underway replenishment ships, oilers, tankers, etc) and foreign bases. The Indian Navy has just acquired two new tankers and two underway replenishment and ammunition ships, and it has reportedly conducted underway replenishment operations.10 China has owned an extensive fleet of tankers and support ships since the ‘90s and has been stepping up the rate of exercises involving them after 2005.11 Much has been made of China’s “string of pearls,” a string of new naval bases and deepwater ports from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Myanmar and Cambodia.12 While the Indian Navy does not yet have as many bases as China, it has built a new base in Madagascar, has berthing rights in Oman and Vietnam, and is negotiating with the Maldives to build a base there.13

Although most emphasis is placed on construction of power projection weapons, offensive weaponry is also being stockpiled by both nations.

India and China are building fleets of modern, stealth frigates and destroyers. These new surface ships are heavily armed and carry some of the most advanced electronics, including Active Electronically Scanned Array radars, which are nearly impossible to jam and can track far more targets than regular radars.14 The most important aspect of these new ships, however, is that they are high endurance: China’s Type 052 destroyers have a range of 4,000 nautical miles15 and India’s Delhi class have a range of 5,000 nautical miles.16

           Acquisition of silent diesel-electric submarines and better armed nuclear submarines, both of which are purely offensive weapons, is also a priority for both countries. India is currently buying the latest submarines from Germany and Russia and is planning to launch 30 new boats by 2030,17 and China has added 42 boats of increasing stealthiness to its fleet since 1995, and expects to add a total of 75 boats by 2020.18

Finally, both countries are upgrading their missile inventories: India has equipped all destroyers and frigates with the stealthy, supersonic, mid-range (290 km), and powerful (armed with a 300 kg warhead) BrahMos missile. It is also deploying the short-range Dhanush ballistic missile, which is armed with either a 500 kg armor piercing warhead that can be used against ships or a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon, onboard its submarines and patrol craft.19 China has built the famed DF-21D, the world’s first ballistic anti-ship missile, which has a staggering 1,500 km range and is considered a serious threat to U.S. carriers.20 China has also acquired hundreds of regular anti-ship cruise missiles, including the Russian SS-N-27N Sizzler which an American admiral has said the U.S. Navy has no known defense against, as well as several satellites to guide long range missiles and air operations.21

Almost all Asian countries have found themselves forced to respond to this arms race. The three making the most significant fleets, other than India and China, are South Korea, Japan, and Russia. South Korea is planning to build 128 ships by 2030, although some of those are just replacing outdated vessels.22 Despite its constitutional ban on war, Japan has the strongest navy in the Pacific region, and it is investing heavily in new fighters, expensive anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), networking technology, and additional “helicopter destroyers” (a euphemism for aircraft carriers). In 2010, Japan announced that it would build its first foreign base since WWII, a navy base in Djbouti, on the Indian Ocean.23 Russia    China, Vietnam, and the Philippines is in the process of modernizing its navy to include two new amphibious assault ships, a new class of ballistic missile submarines (the largest ever built), and over 20 stealthy anti- aircraft frigates and corvettes. The Russian Navy’s latest strategic guidance document makes it clear that the focus of this buildup is the Pacific region, and most of the new ships will be deployed to the Pacific.24

The arms buildup is affecting all countries both in the heart of the region and far away from it; a few examples of this are listed below. The Royal Australian Navy, in the words of Australian Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, plans to “[Evolve] into a much more capable amphibious force, [bring] new air- warfare destroyers into the fleet, and [double] the size of the current submarine force,” in addition to plans to acquire the advanced and stealthy F-35 fighter and to potentially buy American Virginia-class nuclear submarines.25 Pakistan, understandably unnerved by the naval buildup conducted by its longtime enemy India, is investing in new basing infrastructure, more ships, and space and cyber weapons.26 Indonesia is rapidly increasing its military spending and is adding several new vessels to its fleet, including Chinese-built missile boats and ultramodern German diesel-electric submarines.27 Vietnam has begun stockpiling Russian anti- shipping missiles and Canadian maritime patrol aircraft, in addition to buying six very quiet submarines, two frigates, and a large troop transport.28 Even tiny Singapore is modernizing its fleet with the purchase of two Swedish submarines and upgrades to the rest of its submarine fleet.29

Rising tensions

 Rising Tensions

This arms buildup is made worse by the rise in tensions in the region. Most of these tensions center around the South China Sea. Half of the world’s merchant ships, carrying about $2.5 trillion worth of oil and $2.5 trillion worth in other goods, pass through the South China sea,30 meaning that any nation with control over the South China Sea controls world trade and East Asia’s supply of oil. Throw in the fact that the South China Sea is estimated to contain about 15 billion tons of oil and natural gas plus vibrant fishing and sea salt industries, and the South China Sea becomes even more of a prize.31 Naturally, this has led to several nations, namely China, Vietnam and the Philippines claiming overlapping portions of the South China Sea.32 In terms of claiming territory in the South China Sea, China is the worst offender: it claims the entire sea, as well as what it calls the “first island chain”: Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Ryukyu Islands, which are part of Japan.33 Attempts to solve the boundary dispute diplomatically in the regional ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) forum have failed,34 which has raised tension by making Chinese officials believe that force is the only way to resolve the crisis.35

These tensions have occasionally led to crises and violence. In the most recent crisis, which is still ongoing, Chinese and Filipino warships have been in a standoff for over a month because the Philippines detained Chinese fishermen it claimed were fishing in its territorial waters. China is warning its citizens of a potential war, and has deployed five warships to the location of the dispute, including an amphibious transport dock.36 Previous disputes in the region of note include a 2010 incident in which a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship and a 2009 incident where Chinese gunboats stalked an unarmed American surveillance vessel in the South China Sea and nearly collided with it. Notable violent clashes include a 2005 incident in which two Chinese warships fired on Vietnamese fishing boats China claimed entered their territorial waters, killing nine,37 and the 1974 Battle for the Paracel Islands between China and South Vietnam that resulted in South Vietnam losing a corvette and 53 sailors.38

 

Both the naval arms build up and the tensions in the South China Sea are attributable to two factors: rising nationalism and desire for national prestige in some countries, and the response to this nationalism by other nations. The best example of rising nationalism is China. The state-sponsored media regularly portrays the actions of other countries in a negative light, and occasionally calls for military action against foreigners, especially the U.S. and Japan. It tends to glorify China, and makes regular calls for reclaiming China’s “heritage” – hegemony in East Asia – from the West. Postings by Chinese civilians on social media, where nationalistic posts vastly outnumber dissident posts, even on social media not controlled by the government, show that the public buys into this sentiment.39 Japan is also experiencing a wave of nationalism,40 as very right wing candidates are gaining in power. Finally, Indian nationalism, particularly Hindu nationalism, is rising in the form of more Hindu terrorism and Mahanian calls for putting the “Indian” back in the Indian Ocean issued by members of Parliament and bureaucrats.41 Nationalism has led to a desire to assert the power of one’s country on the world stage, which partly explains the rise of aggressive, internationalist foreign policies in China and India. Most Asian nations have become alarmed by these aggressive policies and started arming, which has created the current situation.

Analysis

The United States needs to approach this situation with extreme caution. If the U.S. increased cooperation between its navy and one of its allies’ navies, or increased arms sales to an ally, it would just fuel more arms buildup from countries wary of U.S. influence tilting the balance of power in the region against them. It is thus in America’s best interest to act as a neutral arbiter in the region, deploying to any crisis zone to convince both parties to back down. Being a neutral arbiter of disputes would necessitate both strong offensive and defensive capabilities: offensive capabilities to crush the aggressors if a battle breaks out, and defensive capabilities to shield merchant vessels and allied warships from attack.

This also means that the U.S. will need to change the structure of the force it has in East Asia. Retaliation solely against enemy naval assets makes the most sense since it can quickly end a conflict without escalating it, so weapons that are primarily land-attack, namely Marines, amphibious warfare ships, and strategic bombers, should be moved out of harms way. This is why the Marine Corp’s new base in Darwin, Australia is so crucial: it is out of a potential combat zone, so troops and ships are completely safe there, yet it is close enough to the South China Sea, the heart of East Asia and the most likely location of a future conflict, that ships based there can deploy to a crisis zone quickly. If this base was expanded to include amphibious warfare ships, it could realize its full potential as a new, safe staging area for the United States in the Western Pacific.

The best policy is to not provoke war. The U.S. should pay attention to its actions in the region and be sure that they could not be seen as aggressive. However, these tensions demand a constant, strong show of force by the U.S. to prevent any armed conflicts from breaking out. However, the U.S. Navy alone has the power to police the waters of the South China Sea, cause tensions to cool down before they boil over and become wars, and protect our allies and defeat aggressors in the event of a conflict, so doing anything other than increasing American military presence in Asia is not an option.

Citations

1. “Military Spending 2011 Regional Infographic, Top 10 Military Spenders & More.” Army Technology. 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 17 May 2012.

2. ibid 1

3. “Global Fund for Women.” Militarism Facts. Global Fund for Women, 2010. Web. 17 May 2012.

4. ibid 1

5. Keating, Joshua E. “Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy. Dec. 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

6. Scott, David. “India’s Drive for a ‘Blue Water’ Navy.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10.2 (2008): n. pag. Print.

7. Thomas, Rich. “China Plans World’s Second-Largest Carrier Fleet.” Yahoo! News. Yahoo!, 25 July 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

8. “India Looking for Amphibious Ships.” Defense Industry Daily. 27 Nov. 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

9. Lague, David. “Analysis: New China Landing Vessels Point to Pacific Rivalry.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 14 Feb. 2012. Web. 17 May 2012.

10. ibid 6

11. United States. Congressional Research Service. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress. By Ronald O’Rourke. 2012. Google Docs. Web. 18 May 2012.

12. ibid 11

13. ibid 6

14. AESA Radar: Revolutionary Capabilities for Multiple Missions. N.p.: Lockheed Martin, n.d. Print.

15. “Type 052 (Luhu Class) Missile Destroyer - SinoDefence.com.” Sino Defense. 1 Mar. 2009. Web. 17 May 2012.

16. India. Indian Navy. Ships in Service of the Indian

Navy. 2012. Web.

17. ibid 6

18. ibid 11

19. ibid 6

20. ibid 11

21. ibid 11

22. ibid 5

23. Werthiem, Eric. “World Navies in Review.” Proceedings Mar. 2012: 36-41. Print.

24. Fedyszyn, Thomas. “Renaissance of the Russian Navy?.” Proceedings Mar. 2012: 30-35. Print.

25. Griggs, Ray. “The Commanders Respond.” Proceed- ings Mar. 2012: 16-17. Print.

26. ibid 23

27. ibid 22

28. ibid 22

29. ibid 22

30. United States. Center for Naval Analysis. Institute for

National Strategic Studies. South China Sea Oil Shipping Lanes. Print.

31. “Rich Resources in the South China Sea.” China Oceanic Information Network. People’s Republic of China. Web. 18 May 2012.

32. Bayron, Heda. “ASEAN Meeting to Examine South China Sea Dispute.” Voice of America. U.S.A., 11 July 2011. Web. 18 May 2012.

33. Sato, Koichi. China’s territorial Claims at Sea: The East China and South China Sea. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Google docs. Web. 25 May 2012.

34. Weissmann, Mikael. “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-Asean Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.” Asian Perspective 34.3 (2010): 25-69. Print.

35. Thearith, Leng. Is ASEAN Still Relevant? Phnom Penh: n.p., 2009. Print.

36. McElroy, Damien. “Chinese Media Warns of War with Philipppines.” The Telegraph. 10 May 2012. Web. 18 May 2012.

37. “Vietnam Protests Chinese Firing at Fishing Boats.” Intellasia East Asia News. 15 Jan. 2005. Web. 18 May 2012.

38. Ha, Van Ngnac. “Battle For Paracel Islands.” Battle For Paracel Islands. VNAF MA, 2005. Web. 18 May 2012

39. Grammaticas, Damian. “China’s Rising Nationalism Troubles West.” BBC News. BBC, 17 Nov. 2009. Web. 18 May 2012.

40. Kumagai, Hiroshi. “H. Kumagai: Rising Nationalism in Northeast Asia.” Universal Peace Federation. 17 Sept. 2009. Web. 18 May 2012.

41. Kaplan, Robert D. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.

U.S. Navy and small craft: Part II

In my last post, I explained why small boats are not as big of a threat as many pundits claim. My post may have came across as categorically opposed to all small craft. That is not the case. Instead, I shall argue that small vessels have a big role in our modern Navy, and how they can best serve our fleet.

Previously, I showed how small craft are not particularly good at combating larger vessels. However, small boats are not limited only to harassing larger ships, they can serve some very important purposes as well. These roles have historically included tasks such as patrol of the littorals, fleet scouting, counter-piracy operations, acting as a courier, escorting ships, and interception of couriers. Of these, interception of couriers (particularly drug-running craft today) and counter-piracy operations are probably the most relevant today, since scouting and patrol of the coast are already handled by aircraft and the Coast Guard, respectively, and courier operations are more effectively carried out by invisible submarines or fast jets. Although escorting convoys is an important role warships must play, it is not particularly relevant in this time of global maritime peace.

These requirements for a small warship (counter-piracy and interception of drug-runners with a minor focus on convoy escorting) are further compounded by the nature of the modern U.S. Navy. The Navy operates around the world, which requires all of its boats, including so-called littoral craft, to be able to sail in the open ocean to reach far-flung crisis zones. Further, the wide variety of threats that the Navy faces means that any warship that Navy launches must be multirole.

In addition, the need for a small warship to counter-act the threats of piracy and drug running is immediate. The Navy regularly trumpets that it exists to further freedom of the seas, and right now, the only impediment to freedom of navigation is piracy. The Navy's current fleet, which was largely designed to defeat the Soviets, is wholly inadequate for this task: most Arleigh Burke destroyers are not even equipped with the helicopters or boats necessary for stopping pirate skiffs. Further, pirate craft (and by extension, drug running vessels, which are even faster than pirate vessels) have proven that they are capable of outrunning and out-maneuvering Navy ships. The Navy's huge, billion plus dollar destroyers are also far too expensive for the task of countering piracy or drug-running.

Of course, the Navy is always several steps ahead of me: the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, which has produced two rival ship classes: the Freedom class and the Independence class, has created vessels to address these needs. Although the two ships have received an unreasonable amount of hatred in both Navy circles and on the internet, I shall argue that they are the best boats we could have purchased, for their purpose.

The LCS ships are well suited to the tasks of countering piracy and drug traffic. Both are fast, clocking in at 47 knots for the Freedom and 44 for the Independence. This makes them the fastest ships in the Navy, and as fast as some of the boats they attempt to defeat. [1] Further, the ships are highly maneuverable: both are equipped with independently-steerable water jets, which allow the LCS to turn on a dime, an ability that has been demonstrated in sea trials. [2]. The ships are also seaworthy enough to make long voyages on their own, owing to their high stability in choppy seas [3] and their ranges of roughly 1,500 nm. [4] The ships are equipped with the latest detection equipment, and carry 1-2 helicopters as well as Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) for intercepting pirate, terrorist, or drug running boats.

What makes the LCS unique, however, is their weapons systems. Besides the usual weapons (a naval gun, machine guns, and a CIWS system) the ships are customizable, that is, their main armament can vary depending on the situation at hand, with customization taking less than 48 hours [3]. This allows the LCS to be a minesweeper one day, a subchaser the next, and an air-defense corvette the day after. This customization allows the LCS to fulfill its requirement of being multirole while avoiding the need to carry weapons of all types and thus be a jack of all trades: decent at everything but good at nothing. The success of customizable warships has already been demonstrated with the Royal Danish Navy's Absalon class support ships: large amphibious support vessels that have been used successfully in counter-piracy operations. [5].

Critics assail the Navy for not purchasing the excellent corvettes and patrol boats already on the market, an offense they say is particularly heinous since many corvettes and patrol boats are made here in the U.S. They further point to how useless the LCS would be if forced to fight warships from another nation. However, these arguments miss the point of the LCS: if the Navy wanted a corvette or a patrol boat, it would have bought one. Patrol boats are built to defend the coast (a task taken care of by the Coast Guard and Air Force in the U.S.), while corvettes are intended to fight in a fleet against other ships or land installations, in a manner similar to missile boats or torpedo boats. The LCS is supposed to be a fast counter piracy and drug running ship that can serve as an corvette or minesweeper in a pinch. The LCS is quick, maneuverable, and small (both in terms of overall size and draft), giving it the advantages of a patrol boat in combating small craft. At the same time, it is long range and powerful, giving it the advantages of a corvette. Finally, it has its own, unique advantages over other vessels: its capabilities are not as spread thin as those of a corvette because of its customizability.

In effect, the LCS is the perfect warship for its role. It saves money by taking the role of numerous other ships: minesweepers, fast attack craft, subchasers, patrol craft, etc. It excels in what it does because of its maneuverability, powerful armament, and speed. It can sail great distances in open seas to protect merchant vessels in times of war. And it fills a big gap in U.S. naval capabilities by providing an effective means of defeating fast speedboats and pirates.



Cites
1. http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0918/p05s01-woam.html
2. http://archive.decaturdaily.com/decaturdaily/news/060612/ships.shtml
3.Navy Littoral Comabt Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress. Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs. Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2011
4. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/
5. http://politiken.dk/indland/article691125.ece

U.S. Navy and small craft: Part I

Every few years, the naval brass fret about a new supposedly unbeatable threat to U.S. naval supremacy. In the late '90s, it was diesel-electric submarines. In the last decade, it was Chinese anti-shipping missiles. And right now, the fear of the moment is Iranian small craft. Much of this fear was sparked by a highly-publicized 2002 war game that predicted that the Navy would lose catastrophically in a battle with Iranian small craft. While the methodology of said war game is dubious (see my earlier post on Iran), something still needs to be done to improve the capabilities of the Navy in combating small craft.

It is always prudent to consult history, particularly here. Small warships are as old as naval combat itself, but until recently, small vessels were unable to challenge larger ships because they lacked sufficient stability and freeboard to sail in the ocean, as well as sufficient firepower to even dent the armor of larger vessels, they posed no threat to large surface combatants. This changed in 1866 by the invention of the torpedo, which allowed small boats to successfully defeat much larger battleships. The subsequent introduction of the torpedo boat in 1877 created a panic in naval circles since it was believed that swarms of torpedo boats would allow tiny nations to lay waste to huge, expensive fleets, forever upsetting the balance of power. However, as Mahan observed, these boats were akin to fire-ships in that they were effective at striking fear into the enemy but not very effective at sinking ships. Torpedo boats suffered from the same fates as earlier small craft, plus some new ones: they were dangerous in open waters, had short ranges, could only engage enemy ships effectively at short ranges (at which point they would be ripped up by low-caliber guns), and were too small to carry advanced aiming devices or range finders, a fault that doomed them to inaccuracy. Indeed, early torpedo boats were almost total failures: torpedoes boats in the Russo-Japanese war only sunk one ship that had already been rendered crippled and immobile by battleship fire, and improved torpedo boats in WWI still only sunk one cruiser in the entire war. The destroyer, originally built to defend fleets against the torpedo boat, had largely replaced the torpedo boat by WWI since destroyers were more seaworthy, had a longer range, carried better detection equipment and, most importantly, had guns and depth charges to provide adequate defenses against submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. This trend continued through WWII, where torpedo boats were hampered by increased fleet speeds (which denied torpedo boats the speed and agility advantage they had long relied on) and long-range patrol aircraft, which could detect and defeat torpedo boats before they even came close to an enemy fleet.

Postwar, small vessels again underwent a renaissance. The invention of the guided missile, coupling with the shrinking of electronics, particularly radar, gave rise to the missile boat, a type of fast, short range boat designed to sink larger ships with swarm tactics and then escape speedily. Some larger missile boats could even carry close in weapons systems (CIWS) to defend against enemy missiles and SAMs to protect against aircraft, which ought to have taken away the main liability of torpedo boats: their extreme vulnerability. Initially, it looked as if missile boats were the huge threats that torpedo boats were supposed to be. This is illustrated by several events, especially the famous sinking of the Israeli frigate Eilat by an Egyptian Osa-class missile boat in 1967; the destruction of four Pakistani ships, including a destroyer and two large merchantmen, by Indian missile boats in 1971; and the sinking of five Syrian missile boats by six Israeli missile boats at the Battle of Latakia (the first battle between two fleets of missile boats) in 1973. However, it must be borne in mind that in all three of these engagements, the losers were primarily obsolete ships that lacked defensive countermeasures. The effectiveness of countermeasures, particularly CIWS guns and missiles, has been well demonstrated: the successful use of electronic countermeasures and chaff by the Israelis at Latakia and the effective use of CIWS missiles to defeat anti-ship missiles by the Royal Navy in the Falklands War provide two good examples. Finally, missile boats are still extraordinarily vulnerable to attacks from aircraft and surface ships. To wit, NATO helicopters made short work of the Iraqi Navy's missile craft in the Gulf War, and the U.S. Navy destroyed three Iranian speedboats and one Iranian gunship with aircraft and ship launched missiles in Operation Praying Mantis while taking no casualties.

So the threat posed by Iranian speedboats may not be so dire after all. However, the fact that Iranian speedboats could potentially pose a threat means that the U.S. Navy must create a means by which to defeat this threat. A strategy for defeating Iranian missile boats must be both offensive and defensive: that is, the Navy must be able to both sink Iranian boats and defend itself against attacks by them.

The offensive aspect of fighting Iranian boats is mostly already taken care of. Combat air patrol can be expected to detect incoming Iranian craft and fire on them. However, because Iranian missile boats are small and fairly stealthy, they may be difficult to detect from high altitudes. Thus, it would be prudent to devote a small portion of a carrier's combat air patrol to low-altitude searches for Iranian boats. As the success of helicopter operations against Iraqi missile boats in the Gulf War demonstrates, helicopters can provide a valuable defense against missile boats. However, a helicopter is useless if it is not armed, so the Navy must have its anti-submarine and patrol helicopters carry some kind of light anti-ship missile such as the AGM-65 Maverick (I choose the Maverick because it is currently in U.S. Navy inventory and since its effectiveness against small craft was already demonstrated in the Gulf War) while in the Persian Gulf. Further, surface ships can effectively defeat missile boats using their light guns and anti-aircraft missiles. However, surface ships are useless if they do not detect Iranian craft, so it must be ensured that all Navy ships are equipped with the very latest sensors, and that these sensors are always on.

The main area of concern regarding Iranian missile boats is defense. U.S. Navy vessels are equipped with highly advanced CIWS and electronic countermeasures, which ought to provide adequate defenses against Iranian boats. All Navy ships ought to be equipped with these CIWS guns and electronic countermeasures (ECM). Some ships that currently carry CIWS and ECM ought to carry more of it, particularly the Arleigh Burke flight IIa destroyers (which only carry 1 Phalanx CIWS gun, and ought to carry 2 to give them protection fore and aft) and the Nimitz, Enterprise and Gerald R. Ford class carriers, which all could benefit from more CIWS guns and missiles located in more locations on the ships, to give the carriers 360 degree defensive coverage and redundancy in defenses so that if one CIWS system fails, another can take its place. Also, the U.S. Navy needs to avoid the fate of the INS Hanit (an Israeli corvette hit by a missile because she forgot to activate her countermeasures) and keep ECM and CIWS ready to use at all times, in addition to keeping sensors running at all times to ensure long-range detection of enemy combatants. Finally, to prevent "swarm" attacks, in which vast numbers of small boats overwhelm larger ships by forcing the latter to expend all of their defensive weapons on endless waves of boats, the Navy needs to upgrade all ships to carry AESA radar, which can track more targets than current radars can. Further, U.S. warships ought to carry more ammunition for all of their weapons in order to not get overwhelmed by large numbers of enemies.

Thus, the supposedly lethal threat of Iranian speedboats may not be so scary after all. History has shown that small craft never live up to expectations. The Navy currently has the means to defend itself against any number of small craft attacks, and it can be expected to do so in the event of a conflict. It is probably now time for the naval brass to start looking for the next unbeatable threat to naval supremacy.

U.S.-China War

 Everyone these days talks about a potential war between the US and China. Thus, it would be beneficial to find out what such a war would actually look like.

To understand what a China-US war would play out, we must understand why such a war would be fought and what actions either side would take. The most commonly predicted scenario is a Chinese attack on Taiwan, which would involve a massive first strike using missiles aimed at defeating US forces in the reason. The scenario that the Chinese consider to be “most probable” would involve a US attack on the mainland, presumably to hold on to their status as the world’s sole superpower for a bit longer.(1)

In the first scenario, the Chinese would presumably launch a massive surprise attack on US bases in the region using ballistic missiles with submunitions, attack US naval forces with submarines and missiles, and launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

The amount of missiles and aircraft the Chinese can throw at the local US bases would mean that these bases would be disabled even if air defense systems operate as planned.(3) However, the short scramble time of US jets (around 8 minutes)(4) means that most jets would be able to immediately retaliate. The US has around 500 fighters (5) in the region, while China has about 1000 (2), however the superiority of US aircraft and pilots means that the USAF will wipe out most of the Chinese force in the initial combat.(6) However, since the American planes will lack airbases to return to, and since American tankers are highly vulnerable, most US fighters will crash. Thus US air superiority will depend on aircraft carriers, although their opponent, the PLAAF, will be greatly weakened.

The Chinese will also make a point to attack American satellites on the first night of the war (7). Since the US army and Air Force rely heavily on satellite intelligence, they will not be able to operate as effectively as they have in the past. However, US forces will not be completely crippled without satellites, as their functions can be largely replaced by UAVs, shipborne communications, and portable ground radars. (8) The US also possesses advanced anti-satellite technology, which can also be expected to be used extensively. Thus both sides would be denied satellite use, which would again hurt the US more, although NASA and private space launch firms could quickly replace some satellites.(9)

China also possesses nuclear warheads and ICBMs capable of striking the US, although they only have 240 warheads and even fewer ICBMs. Nevertheless, both China (10) and the US (11) abide by MAD theory and have made it clear that they will not use nuclear weapons. However, if nuclear weapons were to be launched, the inferiority of China’s weapons (they are liquid fueled, making them easier to shoot down and less accurate), their slow response times (Chinese missiles are unfueled in their silos, meaning that their missiles would take three hours to launch, although poor detection systems would make the response time even greater. US missiles, by contrast, can launch in under two minutes, and benefit from an advanced detection system), and the huge size of the American arsenal (5,113 warheads) means that China would be obliterated, at comparatively little cost to the United States. Current US nuclear primacy also means that if a war became unwinnable, nuclear weapons would be on the table. (12)

The biggest variable in the war would be cyber warfare. Both sides posses some kind of cyber warfare capability, although only the US possesses industry disrupting technology like Stuxnet. However, the US is also the most vulnerable to a cyber attack, since their forces rely heavily on network-centric operations and UAVs (which can be hacked). In the event of a major war, the Chinese would have the capability to disable most of the US power grid, injure the economy, and somewhat decrease (though not cripple) the US army’s ability to fight. Whether or not they would be willing to do so remains unclear, but all signs point to yes, since there is no military reason why they would not, and politics would be much less of an issue in a war. The US could easily retaliate, however, and since their cyber warfare capabilities are more advanced. An American counter attack would probably result in a crippling of Chinese communications (which are not secured), network-centric warfare operations, power grid, and probably economy. Thus, the US would benefit most militarily from a cyber war (since network-centric fighting is not vital to the US war effort, and since a loss of communication would be far more devastating to the Chinese than a loss of network-centered warfare capabilities would be to the US), although China would benefit most overall (since the destruction of the US power grid and crippling of the economy would reduce support for the war and make the country unwilling to fight).(13)
However, most of the war will be fought at sea. (14) The Chinese would most likely manufacture crises in the Middle East through Iran (and its terrorist network) to tie down US carriers. It would then deal with the much smaller US force in the region using ballistic missiles (specifically the DF-21D), ship and submarine based anti-ship missiles (AShM), submarines, and naval mines. (15)

The primary concern for US fleets is said to be the DF-21D long range ballistic anti-shipping missile. However, all US fleets include at least one ship equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense, which has been proven to be effective against missiles that fly much faster than the DF-21D. Most scholars agree that Aegis will be effective against threats such as the DF-21D, so China’s ballistic missiles should pose little threat to US naval forces.(16)
China also possesses regular AShMs, which can be fired from aircraft, surface ships, submarines, or land based batteries. The USN has two means of air and missile defense: fighters on patrol and the Aegis Air Defense System. Since the fighters will be involved with air superiority duties, the task of air and missile defense will fall to Aegis. Aegis is a complex system centered around the AN/SPY-1 radar, considered to be the most powerful shipborne radar in the world. The system integrates long range SM-2 anti-aircraft missiles, Enhanced Sea Sparrow missiles and RIM-116 RAM missiles for close in defense, and Phalanx automated autocannon turrets for extreme close in defense. The system has proved effective in most (80%) (17) test engagements against missiles that simulate both cruise and ballistic missiles.(18) Although there are concerns that the Chinese may be able to overwhelm the system with an unending wave of attacks, Aegis is capable of engaging up to one hundred targets at once, although a new AESA-type radar (AN/SPY-3) will increase that number. (19)

However, China has one missile capable of defeating the Aegis system: the Russian 3M-54E Klub cruise missile. It flies stealthily along the surface of the water, and then launches into a supersonic sprint moments before impact, giving the target ship almost no reaction time. The US navy has stated that they lack a means of defeating this missile (20), although the Chinese only have 50 in their inventory (21), meaning that the US can just attack the ships carrying said missiles.

The Chinese also posses extensive amounts of naval mines. However, the US navy possesses extensive anti-mine technology, which it used to great effect in the Gulf War. Further, the few mines that did strike US ships did little damage, and most ships were able to continue operations while sustaining mine damage. (22) Current US mine countermeasures technologies and experience with using these technologies (23) means that mines will at best be a nuisance that could force the US to expend valuable ships mine hunting instead of carrying out combat operations.

The biggest threat to US naval supremacy is submarines, specifically diesel-electric submarines. Modern diesel-electrics are almost completely silent, can swim in shallower waters than their nuclear counterparts, and are far cheaper. The US navy has consistently lost to both modern (such as the Dutch Walrus class) and outdated (such as Australia’s Collins class) subs in exercises. The US Navy also lacks any effective means to train to detect diesel-electric submarines.(24) China has 52 diesel-electric boats, and has both copies of the advanced American Mk. 48 torpedo and the Soviet supersonic Shkval torpedo, both of which can easily sink a carrier.(25)

Finally, although land forces will probably not be a factor in a US-China war, they are worth noting. The USMC is the world’s finest Marine force, in terms of quality of leadership, soldier quality, and technology. Thus the Marines would probably be able to land in either China or Taiwan easily. (26) Although the Marines are presumed to be superior to the PLA, they would be outnumbered so dramatically that any Marine assault would be quick to fail. Attempts to land Army transports would require total sea superiority, which could not be guaranteed due to Chinese submarines. Thus an American land assault would most likely end in complete and total destruction.

So, with these factors in mind, we can imagine a US-China war in which China strikes first would look something like this:
Chinese forces strike first en masse, destroying US airbases, satellites and sinking several ships. The PLAAF is defeated within several days or weeks by naval aviation, local fighter squadrons, and fighters from around the world. US air supremacy allows for two things: ensuring protection of US fleets from AShMs, and pummeling the Chinese forces in Taiwan. China also initiates a cyber attack that destroys most of the US economy and power grid, although the attacks are repulsed quickly. Retaliatory American attacks on Chinese industry, coupled with conventional attacks on Chinese shipping and bombing of industrial centers eliminates public support for the war. After several months, the American public become war-weary after seeing the extreme casualties inflicted upon them by the Chinese. The Chinese government, seeing the damage done to its navy and its economy, decides to pursue peace. The talks come before a US amphibious invasion of the mainland, and although the option is kept on the table, it is a bluff by the US, since such an invasion would most likely be a failure. A treaty is signed, but only after extreme losses in both blood and treasure to both sides.

The other side: US declares war on China
The US government lacks (to my knowledge and the knowledge of the Internet) a plan to actually invade China, since doing so would be economic and political suicide. However, if such an attack were to occur, it would most likely be intended to overthrow the Communist party.
With that as the main objective, indiscriminate killing of civilians would not be an option. Instead, cyber warfare and traditional psychological warfare (PsyOps) would open up the Internet, radio and news to Chinese civilians while spreading propaganda. Meanwhile, airstrikes and cruise missile attacks on radar installations, air defense centers, and government structures. The hope would be for the Chinese public to revolt against their government to spare the US the need to mount an amphibious invasion.

This strategy would probably backfire, for several reasons. First, the Chinese military is designed with one purpose: prevent an invasion. The Chinese navy consists mostly of small missile boats designed to operate only in the littorals (coastal regions). So while these boats would have little effect on a US force defending Japan or Taiwan, they could be a major nuisance to an invasion force. They have an impressive amount of short range ballistic missiles that would easily rout any force that attempts to attack targets there. China also lacks any targets that if destroyed would cripple their air defense system.There is a possibility that such targets exist, but they are classified, however evidence seems to show that China’s radar installations are too widely dispersed to be taken out by a single blow. (27) Further, China has an advanced air defense system that would frustrate any prolonged air campaign in the country.(28)
Second, the Chinese populace seems unwilling to rise up against their government. Support for America is already very high, so PsyOps would have little effect. The Chinese government has reliably crushed democracy demonstrations in times of war or peace, which would deter any possible revolution.

So while a Chinese attack would eventually fail, albeit at high cost to both participants, a US attack would also fail, although for much different reasons.

Citations
1 If it comes to a shooting war..., Victor Corpus, Asia Times Online, 20 April, 2006 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD20Ad03.html
2 Air Combat Past, Present and Future, John Stillion and Scott Perdue, RAND Project Air Force publication, August 2008.
3 Norad on Heightened Alert: Role of air defence agency rapidly transformed in wake of Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Linda Slobodian, published in The Calgary Herald, 13 October 2008
4 http://www.af.mil/publicwebsites/sitecmd.asp?id=8 USAF forces in the Pacific
5 Adam Baddeley (February 2011). "The AMR Regional Air Force Directory 2011". Asian Military Review.
6 IBID #2.
7 IBID #1
8 Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, Norman Freidman, September 1991, Naval Institute Press.
9 Anti-satellite (ASAT) Capabilities of US Missile Defense Systems, David Wright and Laura Grego, Disarmament Diplomacy December 9, 2002.
10 China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence Sr. COL Yao Yunzhu, PLA. Air & Space Power Journal, 1 March 2010. http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/spr10/yao.html
11 Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited, COL Alan Parington, USAF, Airpower Journal, Winter 1997 http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/AIRCHRONICLES/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html. and Obama Endorses Mutual Assured Destruction, Ron Pistaro, 11 July, 2009.
12 The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61508/keir-a-lieber-and-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy
13 HOW CHINA WILL USE CYBER WARFARE TO LEAPFROG IN MILITARY COMPETITIVENESS, Jason Fritz, Culture Mandala, V ol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
14 How We Would Fight China, Robert D. Kaplan, Atlantic Magazine, June 2005. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/06/how-we-would-fight-china/3959/2/
15 IBID #1
16 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke (Specialists in Naval Affairs), CRS report for Congress, 8 April, 2010.
17 Air Defense: Teaching Old Aegis New Tricks, Strategy Page.com, 20 March, 2010. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/20090320.aspx
18 Aegis Cruiser Intercepts Two Simultaneous Targets on Missile Test, Defense Update, 27 April, 2007. http://defense-update.com/newscast/0407/news/270407_aegis_bmd.htm
19 Fact File: Aegis System, US Navy, 2 November 2011 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=200&ct=2
20 Navy Lacks Plan to Defend Against ‘Sizzler’ Missile, Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg, 23 March 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5LkaU0wj714&refer=home
21 China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions, Suijin Guo, Ashgate Publishing ltd., 2006
22 IBID #8
23 21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare, Maj. GEN Thomas Benes, USMC, Anne Sandel, June 2009.
24 Diesel-Electric Submarines, the U.S. Navy’s Latest Annoyance, Grace Jean, National Defense, April 2008, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/April/Pages/AntiSub2301.aspx
25 The PLAN Submarine Force, Sid Trevethan, May 2004.
26 Marines.com
27 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, DOD, FY04 (presumably 2004).
28 China’s Air Defense Missile Systems, Carlo Kopp, Defense Focus.

Why we need more ships

There are two problems facing the economy right now: unemployment and the deficit. Meanwhile, both the Navy and experts at the Department of Defense maintain that we need at least 313 [1] ships for our navy to remain the most powerful in the world, compared to the current total of 286. As the main focus of our geopolitics shifts to the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, one thing becomes apparent: we need more ships. Thankfully, we now have an opportunity to kill three birds with one stone.

Even with recent advances in technology, shipbuilding remains a labor-intensive industry. For example Ingalls Shipbuilding, a mid-size shipyard in Mississippi, is the largest private employer in the state, employing over eleven thousand workers. [2] Like most other heavy manufacturing industries, shipbuilding creates additional jobs as local services, like restaurants and gas stations, needed to support the shipyards. In the case of Seaspan Marine corp., in British Columbia, the construction of a shipyard that employed 1,000 residents created an additional 3,000 jobs nearby. [3]

Despite the common perception that heavy industry jobs are low paying and require no expertise, modern shipbuilding requires mostly skilled workers, such as shipwrights, electricians, and millwrights, which all require years of training and are highly transferable trades. The industry also requires highly skilled workers, such as marine and computer engineers and health officers.
However, much of the benefit of shipbuilding is very indirect. Ships require an enormous supply chain of parts, most of which are located in the United States. Thus shipbuilding creates enormous amounts of jobs in a way that few other industries can. [4]

The benefits to national security of more warships are obvious. Nevertheless, merchant vessels are also required for our security. In a future major conflict, which most experts expect to be naval, losses to US merchant shipping would be severe, and there is no guarantee that foreign shipyards will be willing to rebuild American shipping. Also, in a conflict ships in the United States Merchant Marine can be called up to transport troops and supplies. Further, technologies developed in merchant shipyards can and do transfer to improving military ships (such as high speed ferry technology being used in the Independence class Littoral Combat Ships), and merchant shipyards can be repurposed for building, refitting and repairing navy ships.

How this creates jobs and would increase national security seems clear. Reducing the deficit, however, is not quite as clear. The addition of a great number of jobs means a great amount of tax receipts. Although the expense required to build shipyards and ships will be great, the tax revenues will eventually surpass the initial investment.

There are several possibly criticisms of such a policy, namely that shipbuilding can be replaced by other heavy industries that the US already dominates, and that foreign shipyards, namely those in Korea (who produce the majority of merchant vessels) will undercut American shipbuilding.
What sets shipbuilding apart from other heavy industries like automobiles and aviation is that while the US currently dominates most other industries with little threat from foreign nations, shipbuilding is one of the few industries where the US lags. GM and Boeing are still the largest companies in their field, but only one American-flagged vessel has been laid down in the past decade. Since this industry is so critical to our national security and our prosperity (90% of trade travels by sea) we must keep it strong. Also, the complexity of ships means that their parts chains are larger than those for other industries, spreading the benefits further.

While it is true that most merchant ships are now built in Korea, there is little reason this has to be the case. America has a long history of shipbuilding, and currently has several massive shipyards, albeit for military vessels. All that is required is an influx of capital from the federal government.
Thus, I propose two fairly simple things: provide funds and incentives for the construction of merchant shipyards on American soil and give shipbuilders an incentive (both monetary and in the form of guaranteed protection from US Navy warships) to register their ships under the American Flag.

Citations1 http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,187044,00.html Navy Surface Force in Deep Trouble
2 http://www.huntingtoningalls.com/is/about_us/about_us.html Ingalls Shipbuilding
3 http://www.vancouversun.com/life/Shipbuilding+boom+creates+demand+qualified+workers/5718883/story.html Shipbuilding boom creates demand for qualified workers, The Vancouver Sun, 16 November, 2011
4 http://www.boilermakers.org/resources/commentary/V41N3 We Must Build More Navy Ships