Militarism 2.0: South China Sea

Chinese destroyer Qingdao enters Pearl Harbor in 2006. The fact that she was able to make this long journey demonstrates the high endurance of Chinese warships.

A specter is haunting Asia – the specter of war. Across the continent, from India to Japan, formerly peaceful countries are pursuing aggressive and occasionally expansionist policies. While expansionism is not new in the region, this time is different. Previous conflicts in Asia tended to feature one modern and well-armed nation conquering smaller and weaker ones, as in the rise of Tang China in the 7th century or Imperial Japan in the 20th century. This time, however, there are several different sides involved in a potential run-up to war. Aggressive statements from political leaders are just the public face of the looming crisis. The region is haunted by nationalism, energy disputes, and, most ominously, an arms race.

Arms Race

Since the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions are defined by the sea, this arms race is primarily naval. Although military spending in Asia grew at a slower rate than usual because of the poor state of the economy, Asian military budgets grew by an average of 2.3 percent in 2011.1 While this may not sound like a very large increase, it is significant because military spending in the rest of the world has hit a plateau, which makes Asia the region with the second biggest increase in military spending, after the Middle East.2 Asia’s military buildup is more visible over the long term, as spending has risen 69 percent since 2000, compared to a global increase of 49 percent.3 This is especially concerning because the U.S. and most of its Western European allies are cutting their defense budgets to rein in rising deficits.4

The two countries largely responsible for this jump in spending are also the world’s largest: India and China. By 2030, India plans to spend $45 billion on its navy and add 103 ships to its fleet; China plans to spend $20 billion and add 135 ships. India is the world’s largest arms importer, accounting for nine percent of all global arms trade.5

   

More important than just the numbers of ships India and China plan to acquire, however, is the types of ships they will build and weapons they are buying. Both countries have explicitly stated a desire to own “blue-water” navies,” (fleets that can fight and project power more than 200 miles from their home countries) and are thus investing in power projection weapons, particularly aircraft carriers. India is currently building two new 40,000 ton carriers, is planning to launch a 65,000 ton carrier by 2017, and has purchased $700 million worth of MiG-29ks (Russian carrier-based fighters).6 China, meanwhile, has just launched its first carrier, a refitted 33,000 ton Gorbachev-era ex-Soviet vessel and plans to build four more.7

 

Carriers are useful for projecting influence and fighting conflicts a long distance away from their bases, which makes them exceptionally well suited to power projection and controlling regions. It is worrying that China and India are expressing increased interest in these vessels, since it shows that they likely intend to establish firm spheres of influence in the region using threats of force.

American and Indian aircraft fly over the Indian aircraft carrier INS Viraat.

India and China are interested in another power projection tool recently: amphibious warfare ships, which can transport Marines and launch D-Day style assaults on beaches. India bought its first amphibious warfare ship, an outdated U.S. Navy vessel, last year and plans to acquire four newer ships,8 and China owns two modern (circa 2006) and domestically built amphibious warfare ships and plans to build eight more.9

   

Both nations are also investing in the crucial yet inconspicuous aspects of power projection: support vessels (underway replenishment ships, oilers, tankers, etc) and foreign bases. The Indian Navy has just acquired two new tankers and two underway replenishment and ammunition ships, and it has reportedly conducted underway replenishment operations.10 China has owned an extensive fleet of tankers and support ships since the ‘90s and has been stepping up the rate of exercises involving them after 2005.11 Much has been made of China’s “string of pearls,” a string of new naval bases and deepwater ports from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Myanmar and Cambodia.12 While the Indian Navy does not yet have as many bases as China, it has built a new base in Madagascar, has berthing rights in Oman and Vietnam, and is negotiating with the Maldives to build a base there.13

Although most emphasis is placed on construction of power projection weapons, offensive weaponry is also being stockpiled by both nations.

India and China are building fleets of modern, stealth frigates and destroyers. These new surface ships are heavily armed and carry some of the most advanced electronics, including Active Electronically Scanned Array radars, which are nearly impossible to jam and can track far more targets than regular radars.14 The most important aspect of these new ships, however, is that they are high endurance: China’s Type 052 destroyers have a range of 4,000 nautical miles15 and India’s Delhi class have a range of 5,000 nautical miles.16

           Acquisition of silent diesel-electric submarines and better armed nuclear submarines, both of which are purely offensive weapons, is also a priority for both countries. India is currently buying the latest submarines from Germany and Russia and is planning to launch 30 new boats by 2030,17 and China has added 42 boats of increasing stealthiness to its fleet since 1995, and expects to add a total of 75 boats by 2020.18

Finally, both countries are upgrading their missile inventories: India has equipped all destroyers and frigates with the stealthy, supersonic, mid-range (290 km), and powerful (armed with a 300 kg warhead) BrahMos missile. It is also deploying the short-range Dhanush ballistic missile, which is armed with either a 500 kg armor piercing warhead that can be used against ships or a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon, onboard its submarines and patrol craft.19 China has built the famed DF-21D, the world’s first ballistic anti-ship missile, which has a staggering 1,500 km range and is considered a serious threat to U.S. carriers.20 China has also acquired hundreds of regular anti-ship cruise missiles, including the Russian SS-N-27N Sizzler which an American admiral has said the U.S. Navy has no known defense against, as well as several satellites to guide long range missiles and air operations.21

Almost all Asian countries have found themselves forced to respond to this arms race. The three making the most significant fleets, other than India and China, are South Korea, Japan, and Russia. South Korea is planning to build 128 ships by 2030, although some of those are just replacing outdated vessels.22 Despite its constitutional ban on war, Japan has the strongest navy in the Pacific region, and it is investing heavily in new fighters, expensive anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), networking technology, and additional “helicopter destroyers” (a euphemism for aircraft carriers). In 2010, Japan announced that it would build its first foreign base since WWII, a navy base in Djbouti, on the Indian Ocean.23 Russia    China, Vietnam, and the Philippines is in the process of modernizing its navy to include two new amphibious assault ships, a new class of ballistic missile submarines (the largest ever built), and over 20 stealthy anti- aircraft frigates and corvettes. The Russian Navy’s latest strategic guidance document makes it clear that the focus of this buildup is the Pacific region, and most of the new ships will be deployed to the Pacific.24

The arms buildup is affecting all countries both in the heart of the region and far away from it; a few examples of this are listed below. The Royal Australian Navy, in the words of Australian Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, plans to “[Evolve] into a much more capable amphibious force, [bring] new air- warfare destroyers into the fleet, and [double] the size of the current submarine force,” in addition to plans to acquire the advanced and stealthy F-35 fighter and to potentially buy American Virginia-class nuclear submarines.25 Pakistan, understandably unnerved by the naval buildup conducted by its longtime enemy India, is investing in new basing infrastructure, more ships, and space and cyber weapons.26 Indonesia is rapidly increasing its military spending and is adding several new vessels to its fleet, including Chinese-built missile boats and ultramodern German diesel-electric submarines.27 Vietnam has begun stockpiling Russian anti- shipping missiles and Canadian maritime patrol aircraft, in addition to buying six very quiet submarines, two frigates, and a large troop transport.28 Even tiny Singapore is modernizing its fleet with the purchase of two Swedish submarines and upgrades to the rest of its submarine fleet.29

Rising tensions

 Rising Tensions

This arms buildup is made worse by the rise in tensions in the region. Most of these tensions center around the South China Sea. Half of the world’s merchant ships, carrying about $2.5 trillion worth of oil and $2.5 trillion worth in other goods, pass through the South China sea,30 meaning that any nation with control over the South China Sea controls world trade and East Asia’s supply of oil. Throw in the fact that the South China Sea is estimated to contain about 15 billion tons of oil and natural gas plus vibrant fishing and sea salt industries, and the South China Sea becomes even more of a prize.31 Naturally, this has led to several nations, namely China, Vietnam and the Philippines claiming overlapping portions of the South China Sea.32 In terms of claiming territory in the South China Sea, China is the worst offender: it claims the entire sea, as well as what it calls the “first island chain”: Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Ryukyu Islands, which are part of Japan.33 Attempts to solve the boundary dispute diplomatically in the regional ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) forum have failed,34 which has raised tension by making Chinese officials believe that force is the only way to resolve the crisis.35

These tensions have occasionally led to crises and violence. In the most recent crisis, which is still ongoing, Chinese and Filipino warships have been in a standoff for over a month because the Philippines detained Chinese fishermen it claimed were fishing in its territorial waters. China is warning its citizens of a potential war, and has deployed five warships to the location of the dispute, including an amphibious transport dock.36 Previous disputes in the region of note include a 2010 incident in which a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship and a 2009 incident where Chinese gunboats stalked an unarmed American surveillance vessel in the South China Sea and nearly collided with it. Notable violent clashes include a 2005 incident in which two Chinese warships fired on Vietnamese fishing boats China claimed entered their territorial waters, killing nine,37 and the 1974 Battle for the Paracel Islands between China and South Vietnam that resulted in South Vietnam losing a corvette and 53 sailors.38

 

Both the naval arms build up and the tensions in the South China Sea are attributable to two factors: rising nationalism and desire for national prestige in some countries, and the response to this nationalism by other nations. The best example of rising nationalism is China. The state-sponsored media regularly portrays the actions of other countries in a negative light, and occasionally calls for military action against foreigners, especially the U.S. and Japan. It tends to glorify China, and makes regular calls for reclaiming China’s “heritage” – hegemony in East Asia – from the West. Postings by Chinese civilians on social media, where nationalistic posts vastly outnumber dissident posts, even on social media not controlled by the government, show that the public buys into this sentiment.39 Japan is also experiencing a wave of nationalism,40 as very right wing candidates are gaining in power. Finally, Indian nationalism, particularly Hindu nationalism, is rising in the form of more Hindu terrorism and Mahanian calls for putting the “Indian” back in the Indian Ocean issued by members of Parliament and bureaucrats.41 Nationalism has led to a desire to assert the power of one’s country on the world stage, which partly explains the rise of aggressive, internationalist foreign policies in China and India. Most Asian nations have become alarmed by these aggressive policies and started arming, which has created the current situation.

Analysis

The United States needs to approach this situation with extreme caution. If the U.S. increased cooperation between its navy and one of its allies’ navies, or increased arms sales to an ally, it would just fuel more arms buildup from countries wary of U.S. influence tilting the balance of power in the region against them. It is thus in America’s best interest to act as a neutral arbiter in the region, deploying to any crisis zone to convince both parties to back down. Being a neutral arbiter of disputes would necessitate both strong offensive and defensive capabilities: offensive capabilities to crush the aggressors if a battle breaks out, and defensive capabilities to shield merchant vessels and allied warships from attack.

This also means that the U.S. will need to change the structure of the force it has in East Asia. Retaliation solely against enemy naval assets makes the most sense since it can quickly end a conflict without escalating it, so weapons that are primarily land-attack, namely Marines, amphibious warfare ships, and strategic bombers, should be moved out of harms way. This is why the Marine Corp’s new base in Darwin, Australia is so crucial: it is out of a potential combat zone, so troops and ships are completely safe there, yet it is close enough to the South China Sea, the heart of East Asia and the most likely location of a future conflict, that ships based there can deploy to a crisis zone quickly. If this base was expanded to include amphibious warfare ships, it could realize its full potential as a new, safe staging area for the United States in the Western Pacific.

The best policy is to not provoke war. The U.S. should pay attention to its actions in the region and be sure that they could not be seen as aggressive. However, these tensions demand a constant, strong show of force by the U.S. to prevent any armed conflicts from breaking out. However, the U.S. Navy alone has the power to police the waters of the South China Sea, cause tensions to cool down before they boil over and become wars, and protect our allies and defeat aggressors in the event of a conflict, so doing anything other than increasing American military presence in Asia is not an option.

Citations

1. “Military Spending 2011 Regional Infographic, Top 10 Military Spenders & More.” Army Technology. 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 17 May 2012.

2. ibid 1

3. “Global Fund for Women.” Militarism Facts. Global Fund for Women, 2010. Web. 17 May 2012.

4. ibid 1

5. Keating, Joshua E. “Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy. Dec. 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

6. Scott, David. “India’s Drive for a ‘Blue Water’ Navy.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10.2 (2008): n. pag. Print.

7. Thomas, Rich. “China Plans World’s Second-Largest Carrier Fleet.” Yahoo! News. Yahoo!, 25 July 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

8. “India Looking for Amphibious Ships.” Defense Industry Daily. 27 Nov. 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

9. Lague, David. “Analysis: New China Landing Vessels Point to Pacific Rivalry.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 14 Feb. 2012. Web. 17 May 2012.

10. ibid 6

11. United States. Congressional Research Service. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress. By Ronald O’Rourke. 2012. Google Docs. Web. 18 May 2012.

12. ibid 11

13. ibid 6

14. AESA Radar: Revolutionary Capabilities for Multiple Missions. N.p.: Lockheed Martin, n.d. Print.

15. “Type 052 (Luhu Class) Missile Destroyer - SinoDefence.com.” Sino Defense. 1 Mar. 2009. Web. 17 May 2012.

16. India. Indian Navy. Ships in Service of the Indian

Navy. 2012. Web.

17. ibid 6

18. ibid 11

19. ibid 6

20. ibid 11

21. ibid 11

22. ibid 5

23. Werthiem, Eric. “World Navies in Review.” Proceedings Mar. 2012: 36-41. Print.

24. Fedyszyn, Thomas. “Renaissance of the Russian Navy?.” Proceedings Mar. 2012: 30-35. Print.

25. Griggs, Ray. “The Commanders Respond.” Proceed- ings Mar. 2012: 16-17. Print.

26. ibid 23

27. ibid 22

28. ibid 22

29. ibid 22

30. United States. Center for Naval Analysis. Institute for

National Strategic Studies. South China Sea Oil Shipping Lanes. Print.

31. “Rich Resources in the South China Sea.” China Oceanic Information Network. People’s Republic of China. Web. 18 May 2012.

32. Bayron, Heda. “ASEAN Meeting to Examine South China Sea Dispute.” Voice of America. U.S.A., 11 July 2011. Web. 18 May 2012.

33. Sato, Koichi. China’s territorial Claims at Sea: The East China and South China Sea. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Google docs. Web. 25 May 2012.

34. Weissmann, Mikael. “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-Asean Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.” Asian Perspective 34.3 (2010): 25-69. Print.

35. Thearith, Leng. Is ASEAN Still Relevant? Phnom Penh: n.p., 2009. Print.

36. McElroy, Damien. “Chinese Media Warns of War with Philipppines.” The Telegraph. 10 May 2012. Web. 18 May 2012.

37. “Vietnam Protests Chinese Firing at Fishing Boats.” Intellasia East Asia News. 15 Jan. 2005. Web. 18 May 2012.

38. Ha, Van Ngnac. “Battle For Paracel Islands.” Battle For Paracel Islands. VNAF MA, 2005. Web. 18 May 2012

39. Grammaticas, Damian. “China’s Rising Nationalism Troubles West.” BBC News. BBC, 17 Nov. 2009. Web. 18 May 2012.

40. Kumagai, Hiroshi. “H. Kumagai: Rising Nationalism in Northeast Asia.” Universal Peace Federation. 17 Sept. 2009. Web. 18 May 2012.

41. Kaplan, Robert D. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.

How to contain Brazil

    As American presidential candidates and pundits alike yammer about the threat posed by a rising China, the rise of another potentially unfriendly superpower closer to home has been ignored. This nation is Brazil, the seventh richest country in the world1, ahead of Britain, and the third highest GDP growth rate2 from 2000 to 2010. Although Brazil is not nearly strong enough to challenge American hegemony, it is powerful enough to frustrate U.S. policies and actions in ways that harm U.S. interests. Therefore, the United States should not only take actions to convince Brazil to support the U.S., but it should also work to break up Brazil’s power.

Brazil’s rising power status is questioned by nobody. Brazil’s rise is a true success story; a fight against both an unforgiving geography and relentless inflation3 that kept the country in endless poverty despite high growth. Brazil’s rainforest geography, lack of easily accessible arable land (most arable land is deep in the interior rainforest) have provided significant obstacles to growth. The natural barrier provided by the Amazon ensures that all trade and thus all major cities are confined to the Atlantic Ocean, which further frustrates growth because the Great Escapade, a high wall of mountains, runs along the coast except for in a few small pockets, confining Brazil’s cities to these small pockets and thereby preventing transportation links between Brazilian cities and the development of economies of scale.3 Brazil shot up to prominence once the forests were cleared and roads built, creating farmland and  enabling the rise of a middle class of small farmers.3 Further, the implementation of the Real Plan (named for the Real, the new Brazilian currency created by the plan) in 1994 brought inflation down from 45 percent in 1994 to one percent in 1996 by tightening monetary policy, floating the currency, and tying the Real to the dollar.5 While this destruction of inflation hampered growth by tightening credit and cutting deficit spending, the Real Plan vastly increased the purchasing power of most Brazilians, decreasing the poverty rate by 10 percent in two years5 and creating a consumer economy in Brazil from scratch. It is the largest country in South America, both in terms of population and wealth. Despite having growth decreased by the Real Plan, Brazil’s growth rate remains high, as mentioned before. Further, this growth appears to be here to stay: Brazil’s economy is largely based on agriculture, and its products, particularly soybeans (needed for tofu, food additives and animal feed) and sugar cane (used as biofuel and food sweetener) are in high demand and will likely remain so in the future.6 The Brazilian people’s high purchasing power, and the fact that the Brazilian poverty rate is plummeting, ensures the long-term health of the domestic consumption economy as a main driver of growth. Brazil has also discovered enormous oil fields: Brazil sits on 50 billion barrels of oil, enough to propel it into the top five oil producers by 2020,7 and some estimate that 70-100 billion barrels more are located offshore.8 Although Brazil slumped in 2011, this slump was largely the result of faltering consumer spending, a problem that can be easily overcome. Likewise, Brazil's inflation crisis, which is largely the result of excessive foreign investment from China, can be solved through tighter currency regulations. 14, 3

This wealth has translated to regional dominance. The Brazilian state-owned firm Petrobras controls the Bolivian natural-gas industry, the largest sector in the Bolivian economy, and almost all Bolivian agricultural products are shipped to Brazil. Large numbers of Brazilians have migrated to Paraguay, and Brazil is the largest investor in the Paraguayan economy, particularly in its energy sector. Brazilian cash drives Uruguay’s financial industry, the main driver of Uruguay’s economy, and Brazilians now own a majority of Uruguay’s farmland.3 All told, Brazil is the largest direct investor in Latin American nations and the most powerful country in the region, giving it the status of regional hegemon.

In the past, Brazil’s power has been checked by that of its neighbors, particularly Argentina. Argentina benefits from many large navigable rivers (which facilitate trade) and the fact that most of its territory is large arable plains, which facilitate not only large-scale agriculture but economies of scale and giant cities. Historically, these geographic advantages have played out in the way one would expect: Argentina wore the pants in the Argentina-Brazil relationship. Argentina dominated the Southern Cone region (Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Southern Brazil) that formed the heartland of South America after Argentina’s victory against Brazil in the 1825 Cisplatine War. By dominating this crucial, resource rich region, Argentina rose to global prominence and was even able to challenge European powers, seen most recently in the Falklands War. Although modern Argentina is but a shadow of its former self, it remains the second most powerful country in South America and the only potential threat to Brazil.

Recognizing the threat posed by Argentina, Brazil has undertaken a number of successful measures to ally itself with Argentina. The two countries consider each other to be in a “strategic alliance,” and their militaries collaborate extensively.9 Brazil and Argentina have collaborated on designing military aircraft, and their militaries frequently drill together. Most importantly, the two countries have shared details on their top-secret uranium enrichment plants with each other. Further, Brazil supports Argentina in Argentina’s claim over the Falklands Islands, Argentina’s biggest foreign policy issue.10 However, the main way in which Brazil has formed a cohesive power block in South America is economically, through the Mercosur trade agreement that involves Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay i.e. Brazil and the Southern Cone nations. Mercosur is a free-trade organization with a standardized external trade policy, similar to NAFTA or ASEAN. Mercosur has led to great amounts of trade and migration between Brazil and Argentina, deepening their ties. Mercosur is also the main means by which Brazil controls the Southern Cone: while individual deals brought local nations into Brazilian suzerainty, Brazil sets the common foreign policies of the region through Mercosur.10

With its one major enemy removed, and its status as regional hegemon fully secured, Brazil stepped on to the world stage. Brazil leads the UN mission in Haiti, has tripled its foreign aid budget since 200811 and has participated in 27 UN peacekeeping missions. However, Brazil’s stint in the international arena has been anything but beneficial to the U.S. Historically, Brazil has been unfriendly to the U.S.; Brazil worked with the Chinese and the Soviets during the Cold War and refused to oppose Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Brazil refuses to cooperate with American demands, seen in Brazil’s unwillingness to pacify its neighbors or crack down on drug lords in neighboring countries.12 Another major source of friction between the two nations is an incident in which Brazil negotiated with Iran in 2010, despite explicit U.S. instructions not to interact with Iran. Economically, Brazil has been working to exclude the U.S. from South America through economic integration unions such as Mercosur and was the main opponent of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in addition to raising tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods. Further, Brazil has worked to actively oppose U.S. actions. Brazil has opposed American anti-drug lord operations in Colombia and has even insisted that any American military actions in South America be approved by Brazil first. Brazil has also opposed most recent U.S. foreign policy, particularly the War on Terror, the invasion of Libya and the U.S. attempt to pass a UN Security Council resolution condemning Syria. Overall, Brazil’s attitude towards the U.S. is one of suspicion: Brazil regards the U.S. as an obstacle to its rise and thus is unfriendly towards the U.S.13

The United States ought to undertake a two-pronged approach to protecting its interests from Brazil. First, the U.S. needs to reach out to Brazil in order to show the Brazilian government that American interests and values are aligned with those of Brazil. Value-wise, both countries are Western-style republics that value democracy and liberty. Brazil benefits from the security provided to it by U.S. hegemony and is made wealthy by the freedom of navigation the U.S. Navy provides. The U.S. should try to convince the Brazilian leadership, through state visits and possibly through incentives such as subsidies for sugar-cane based biofuels from Brazil, that U.S. hegemony benefits Brazil. Second, the U.S. must try to peacefully frustrate Brazilian regional hegemony. This can be done in two ways: by assisting South American nations that are opposed to Brazil and by creating an alternative to Mercosur. Already, Brazil’s rise has hit opposition from several South American countries, particularly Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia. The U.S. can reach out to Colombia by providing more assistance in attacking drug operations there and by increasing trade to Colombia, which would pull the country away from Brazil. Likewise, U.S. investment in developing Bolivian resources, particularly in the emerging and strategic lithium industry, could make the U.S. Bolivia’s main trading partner and thus bring Bolivia out of Brazil’s shadow. Although Colombia and Bolivia are the two pieces of low-hanging fruit, efforts to strengthen ties with South American nations to weaken Brazil’s grip on the region must be made with most South American countries. The centerpiece of this weakening of Brazilian hegemony should be the creation of an alternative to Mercosur. Mercosur is already faltering, as it is becoming obvious that the organization exists solely as a means to further Brazilian power and not to promote free trade.3 If the U.S. were to create a free-trade organization in South America incorporating the Mercosur countries and other South American nations, this would tie South America to the U.S. instead of Brazil, especially if this free-trade organization was more of a free-trade organization than Mercosur is. Inevitable Brazilian opposition to such an organization can be circumvented by offering membership to the other Mercosur nations first, and then letting peer pressure kick in.

Brazil’s rise cannot be halted, nor should it be. However, Brazil’s economic strength need not imply regional hegemony, a fact that can be ensured by increased U.S. involvement in South America. 

Pictured above: A Brazilian oil platform, the first to tap the massive and newly discovered "sugar loaf" deposit off of Brazil's coast. Platforms like this one will catapult Brazil into the ranks of the world's largest oil producers and ensure Brazilian economic growth for decades.

Citations

1. "Brazil." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 6 Feb. 2012.

2. International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. N.p.: n.p., 2011. IMF.org. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

3. The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography. N.p.: STRATFOR, n.d. Print.

4.  Clemons, Benedict. The Real Plan, Poverty, and Income Distribution in Brazil. N.p.: IMF, 1997. Finance and Development. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

5. Pielow, Christian. "Brazil – A New Future." The Executive Search Blog. Blue Steps, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

6. "Filling Up the Future." The Economist 5 Nov. 2011: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

7.  "A Big Oil Discovery." The Economist 12 Feb. 2008: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

8. Shifter, Michael. "Argentina-Brazil Relations." World Politics Review. Trend Lines, 22 Dec. 2010. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

9. "Brazil reiterates support for Argentina, denies any blockade to the Falklands." MercoPress 1 Feb. 2012: n. pag. MercoPress South Atlantic News Agency. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

10. Varas, Augusto. Brazil in South America: From Indifference to Hegemony. N.p.: FRIDE, 2008. FRIDE. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.

11. "Speak Softly and Carry a Blank Cheque." The Economist 15 July 2010: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.

12. Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Luiz. "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations withthe United States." Latin American Perspectives 33.3 (2006): 12-27.JSTOR. Web. 7 Apr. 2012. .

13. Hakim, Peter. "Why the US and Brazil Can't Get Along – A Story of Turf, Ideology, and Interests." Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica (Mar. 2011): n.pag. Inter-American Dialogue. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.
14.  "Brazil News." The New York Times 7 Dec. 2010: n. pag. The New York Times. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.