Corruption in China as a force-multiplier

Reports are coming out of intense corruption in the Chinese military. These come as no surprise, since China is a highly corrupt society to begin with thanks to the unusually close relationship between government and business that characterizes Chinese state-capitalism and China's ancient tradition of wealthy nobility being awarded government positions that dates back to the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE. Corruption in the military hampers the effectiveness of communication and lowers discipline, while corruption in the civilian government keeps millions in poverty and creating a major wealth disparity between the rich Eastern cities and the poorer yet more populous West.

On its face, this looks pretty good for the U.S. America is in the business of maintaining its hegemony, which it can do by keeping its challengers down. Corruption hurts China by hurting the Chinese economy, weakening their military, and increasing the possibility of a revolution by the poor West.

However, the U.S. has both a moral and realist responsibility to denounce corruption in China. Morally, the U.S. must denounce corruption because it unfairly hurts China's poor and kills millions, which no upright human being can allow. This in turn would increase America's soft power and moral standing in the world by showing other nations that the U.S. cares about helping the little guy. From a realist point of view, however, denouncing corruption by sending Hilary Clinton to China to give a speech saying something along the lines of "rampant corruption like China's makes a government illegitimate" would help speed along a collapse of the Communist Party. How would this work? First, it is highly improbable that any speech by a U.S. official, even by the President, would force China to change its corrupt ways. Corruption in China is too deeply entrenched and too ancient of a tradition to be ended by a speech. Further, despite the amazing volume of organizations, money, and laws (1,200 of the latter) that have been used to attempt to fight corruption in China, corruption has increased, not decreased.

While denouncing Chinese corruption is unlikely to deny the U.S. the benefits of this corruption, it will likely incite anger against the regime. Corruption in China is well-known, but most Chinese I have talked to merely regard it as a fact of life and not as an evil. It would not be particularly hard to show a large swath of the Chinese people who corruption hurts them because this is plainly evident in most parts of the country. If a speech by Hilary Clinton or another prominent, well-known American were to call corruption evil, it could incite some small-scale revolts against the Chinese leadership, which would in turn weaken China. Even if that does not happen, the end result is still good: China remains hobbled by corruption while the U.S. gets a new image as a moral crusader for justice.

How to stop Russia's rise with natural gas

On New Year’s Day, 2009, a dispute over payment between Russia and Ukraine led to Russia cutting off all Ukraine bound gas, which included 25 percent of the European Union’s gas supply.1 To make things worse, Europe was in the middle of an especially harsh winter. Even though most countries had prepared for a gas shortage by stockpiling natural gas, their efforts were not enough, as few European countries had more than a month’s worth of reserves, and many lacked any reserves. The crisis hit Europe hard: Bulgaria was forced to shut off industrial production to save fuel for heating, thousands lost heating and electricity, and tiny Slovakia even declared a national state of emergency.1

This is not an isolated event. Russia has halted Europe’s gas supply in 1999, 2006, 2009, and 2012, each time in the dead of winter. The 2009 shortage cost €1 billion in Ireland alone2, and the 2012 shortage caused 650 deaths in Central and Eastern Europe.3 Although the EU as a whole gets only 31 percent of its gas from Russia, many Eastern European countries get 90-100 percent of their gas through Ukraine, and Germany, the EU’s de facto leader, gets 42 percent.4 Besides denying thousands of people heat for the homes and offices and severely injuring economies, these gas crises have broader geopolitical implications. Ukraine gave half the ownership of its gas pipeline, its biggest source of revenue, over to Gazprom (the Russian state-owned energy agency) after the 2009 crisis. Further, Russia took over most Ukrainian mines and power stations, has sent in many Gazprom security police to guard the pipeline (actually heavily armed soldiers and drones), boosted cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian defense ministries, has secured not only a more favorable Ukrainian government but also a much longer lease on its critical Black Sea base in Sevastopol, and, most ominously, has begun implementing political reforms in Ukraine to make Ukraine more like Russia. Russia has also exploited the total reliance of Eastern Europe on Gazprom’s natural gas in mid-2009 when it set up a number of security and economic alliances that heavily favored Russia (think Warsaw Pact part II).5 When Turkey lost 67 percent of its gas in 2009, it cozied up to Iran to get gas from them. Turkey helped Iran build a major pipeline through Turkey, a pipeline that until very recently continued to operate despite sanctions on Iran.

Further, Russia is not nearly as dependent on the EU as the EU is on Russia. Russia is building new pipelines to China and the Koreas, and has recently completed pipelines to China in 2010, and to Turkey and the Caucus region in 2006.6, 7, 8 Demand from Turkey and China nearly equals demand from Europe,8 meaning that Russia can make up lost gas revenues from Europe by simply increasing gas supply to other countries.

Europe’s reliance on Russian gas stems largely from the fact that Europe has little gas of its own. However, it seems puzzling that European nations continue to rely on authoritarian and unpredictable Russia in light of recent events in the gas market. 2011 was a record year for U.S. natural gas production, which now outstrips domestic demand by 119 billion cubic meters.9 This is excess is far greater than European demand, which currently amounts to 65 billion cubic meters.1 American shale gas is cheap, too: it is at the lowest price in a decade. This boom and low price is largely attributable to recent advances in shale-gas mining techniques that have opened up billions of cubic meters of gas up to drilling.10 Exporting this excess gas to Eastern Europe would be beneficial for gas companies and U.S. foreign relations: gas companies would make greater profits while the U.S. would keep Eastern Europe out of Russia’s sphere of influence. Further, Europeans citizens would benefit from U.S. gas: American natural gas costs $30 per 1,000 cubic meters11, while Russian gas shipped to Western Europe costs $500 per 1,000 cubic meters and gas shipped through Ukraine costs $250 per 1,000 cubic meters.12 If natural gas prices were lowered this dramatically, Europe’s economic recovery would speed up rapidly.

So what is it that stops the U.S. from exporting more gas to Europe? As usual, the answer is money. Natural gas must undergo an expensive liquefaction process before sea transport, while it can be left in its natural gaseous state for pipeline transport. Further, after a sea journey, natural gas must be regassified, a process that can only be done at expensive terminals that usually cost more than $1 billion13 to build.

In the long run, it is worthwhile to make investments in building regasification terminals in Eastern Europe because the expected monetary payoff to gas companies and political payoff to the U.S. government is so great. In the short term, however, stop gap measures must be taken. The U.S. can assist European nations in acquiring machines called floating regasification and storage units (FSRUs), natural gas tankers converted to serve as regasification terminals. FSRUs can be leased for an average of $70 million per year, an inexpensive price considering that one FSRU can regassify 3.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas, or 125 percent of Lithuania’s natural gas consumption. FSRUs are also much quicker to build than regasification terminals. Already, Lithuania, one of the first European countries to lease an FSRU, has seen its negotiating power with the Russian leadership increase after it leased its FSRU earlier this year.14

To do its part, Europe can start developing its own shale gas reserves and diversifying its gas sources. The EU sits on 2.168 trillion cubic meters14 of accessible natural gas. If the EU were to build facilities for extracting this gas, it could hypothetically eliminate the need for foreign supplies of gas. Further, the EU could turn to other sources of gas, such as Qatar or Mozambique, both of which have made enormous natural gas discoveries recently.15

The process of weaning Europe off of Russia’s teat may be dirty and expensive. But the end result, a steep drop in Russian influence in Europe, particularly Eastern Europe, will be enormously valuable from a geopolitical standpoint. Once Russian influence is no more in Europe, true integration of Eastern Europe into the EU and the Schengen Area can begin, which will further bolster the EU and make it an effective counterweight to Russia. This would be particularly beneficial for the U.S., which has a prime opportunity to accelerate the recovery by bolstering the natural gas industry and to weaken its old foe. America would be a fool not to take it.

 
Citations 
1.. "FACTBOX - 18 countries affected by Russia-Ukraine gas row." Reuters 7 Jan. 2009:
    n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
"Natural gas shortages slam many European nations." Tuscon Citizen 7 Jan. 2009: n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
2. Leahy, Eimear & Devitt, Conor & Lyons, Seán & Tol, Richard S. J., 2011. "The Cost of Natural Gas Shortages in Ireland, "WP397, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
3. Murray, Alina. "Cold Weather Snap in Eastern Europe Kills More Than 650." MSNBC 2 Feb. 2012: n. pag. MSNBC. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
4.European Union. EU-Russian Gas Relations in Perspective: Challenges and Opportunities. N.p.: European Dialogue, 2012. European Dialogue. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
5. United States. U.S. Army. Russian Influence on Ukrainian Strategic Policy. By Defek G.
    Webb. Charleston, SC: U.S. Army, 2011. Print.
6. Stnagarone, Troy. "Russia's North Korea Gas Deal." The Diplomat 15 Nov. 2011: n. pag. New Leader Forum. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
7. British Petroleum. “Southern Caucasus Pipeline overview."
8. Reuters. "New Russian pipeline replaces oil by rail." Global Times 10 Dec. 2010: n. pag. Global Times: Discover China Discover the World. Web. 13 Apr. 2012..
9. United States. Energy Information Administration. Natural Gas Overview. N.p.: Energy Information Administration, 2012. Department of Energy. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
10. Osborne, Andrew. "Why natural gas is cheap and gasoline isn’t." New York Times 30 Mar. 2012: n. pag. NYT. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
11.United States. Energy Information Administration. Quantity and Average Price of Natural Gas Production in the United States, 1930-2000. N.p.: Energy Information Administration, 2000. Department of Energy. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
12. Osborne, Andrew. "Russia Firm Cuts Gas to Ukraine, But EU Hit Is Cushioned ." Wall Street Journal 2 Jan. 2009: n. pag. WSJ. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
13. "Lithuania leveraging a new LNG technology." STRATFOR 8 Mar. 2012: n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
14. "European Union." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 3 Apr. 2012.
15.LeVine, Steve. " For Alaska (and Qatar and Mozambique and Russia) China is the hub of hope." Foreign Policy 12 Apr. 2012: n. pag. Foreign Policy. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .

How to contain Brazil

    As American presidential candidates and pundits alike yammer about the threat posed by a rising China, the rise of another potentially unfriendly superpower closer to home has been ignored. This nation is Brazil, the seventh richest country in the world1, ahead of Britain, and the third highest GDP growth rate2 from 2000 to 2010. Although Brazil is not nearly strong enough to challenge American hegemony, it is powerful enough to frustrate U.S. policies and actions in ways that harm U.S. interests. Therefore, the United States should not only take actions to convince Brazil to support the U.S., but it should also work to break up Brazil’s power.

Brazil’s rising power status is questioned by nobody. Brazil’s rise is a true success story; a fight against both an unforgiving geography and relentless inflation3 that kept the country in endless poverty despite high growth. Brazil’s rainforest geography, lack of easily accessible arable land (most arable land is deep in the interior rainforest) have provided significant obstacles to growth. The natural barrier provided by the Amazon ensures that all trade and thus all major cities are confined to the Atlantic Ocean, which further frustrates growth because the Great Escapade, a high wall of mountains, runs along the coast except for in a few small pockets, confining Brazil’s cities to these small pockets and thereby preventing transportation links between Brazilian cities and the development of economies of scale.3 Brazil shot up to prominence once the forests were cleared and roads built, creating farmland and  enabling the rise of a middle class of small farmers.3 Further, the implementation of the Real Plan (named for the Real, the new Brazilian currency created by the plan) in 1994 brought inflation down from 45 percent in 1994 to one percent in 1996 by tightening monetary policy, floating the currency, and tying the Real to the dollar.5 While this destruction of inflation hampered growth by tightening credit and cutting deficit spending, the Real Plan vastly increased the purchasing power of most Brazilians, decreasing the poverty rate by 10 percent in two years5 and creating a consumer economy in Brazil from scratch. It is the largest country in South America, both in terms of population and wealth. Despite having growth decreased by the Real Plan, Brazil’s growth rate remains high, as mentioned before. Further, this growth appears to be here to stay: Brazil’s economy is largely based on agriculture, and its products, particularly soybeans (needed for tofu, food additives and animal feed) and sugar cane (used as biofuel and food sweetener) are in high demand and will likely remain so in the future.6 The Brazilian people’s high purchasing power, and the fact that the Brazilian poverty rate is plummeting, ensures the long-term health of the domestic consumption economy as a main driver of growth. Brazil has also discovered enormous oil fields: Brazil sits on 50 billion barrels of oil, enough to propel it into the top five oil producers by 2020,7 and some estimate that 70-100 billion barrels more are located offshore.8 Although Brazil slumped in 2011, this slump was largely the result of faltering consumer spending, a problem that can be easily overcome. Likewise, Brazil's inflation crisis, which is largely the result of excessive foreign investment from China, can be solved through tighter currency regulations. 14, 3

This wealth has translated to regional dominance. The Brazilian state-owned firm Petrobras controls the Bolivian natural-gas industry, the largest sector in the Bolivian economy, and almost all Bolivian agricultural products are shipped to Brazil. Large numbers of Brazilians have migrated to Paraguay, and Brazil is the largest investor in the Paraguayan economy, particularly in its energy sector. Brazilian cash drives Uruguay’s financial industry, the main driver of Uruguay’s economy, and Brazilians now own a majority of Uruguay’s farmland.3 All told, Brazil is the largest direct investor in Latin American nations and the most powerful country in the region, giving it the status of regional hegemon.

In the past, Brazil’s power has been checked by that of its neighbors, particularly Argentina. Argentina benefits from many large navigable rivers (which facilitate trade) and the fact that most of its territory is large arable plains, which facilitate not only large-scale agriculture but economies of scale and giant cities. Historically, these geographic advantages have played out in the way one would expect: Argentina wore the pants in the Argentina-Brazil relationship. Argentina dominated the Southern Cone region (Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Southern Brazil) that formed the heartland of South America after Argentina’s victory against Brazil in the 1825 Cisplatine War. By dominating this crucial, resource rich region, Argentina rose to global prominence and was even able to challenge European powers, seen most recently in the Falklands War. Although modern Argentina is but a shadow of its former self, it remains the second most powerful country in South America and the only potential threat to Brazil.

Recognizing the threat posed by Argentina, Brazil has undertaken a number of successful measures to ally itself with Argentina. The two countries consider each other to be in a “strategic alliance,” and their militaries collaborate extensively.9 Brazil and Argentina have collaborated on designing military aircraft, and their militaries frequently drill together. Most importantly, the two countries have shared details on their top-secret uranium enrichment plants with each other. Further, Brazil supports Argentina in Argentina’s claim over the Falklands Islands, Argentina’s biggest foreign policy issue.10 However, the main way in which Brazil has formed a cohesive power block in South America is economically, through the Mercosur trade agreement that involves Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay i.e. Brazil and the Southern Cone nations. Mercosur is a free-trade organization with a standardized external trade policy, similar to NAFTA or ASEAN. Mercosur has led to great amounts of trade and migration between Brazil and Argentina, deepening their ties. Mercosur is also the main means by which Brazil controls the Southern Cone: while individual deals brought local nations into Brazilian suzerainty, Brazil sets the common foreign policies of the region through Mercosur.10

With its one major enemy removed, and its status as regional hegemon fully secured, Brazil stepped on to the world stage. Brazil leads the UN mission in Haiti, has tripled its foreign aid budget since 200811 and has participated in 27 UN peacekeeping missions. However, Brazil’s stint in the international arena has been anything but beneficial to the U.S. Historically, Brazil has been unfriendly to the U.S.; Brazil worked with the Chinese and the Soviets during the Cold War and refused to oppose Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Brazil refuses to cooperate with American demands, seen in Brazil’s unwillingness to pacify its neighbors or crack down on drug lords in neighboring countries.12 Another major source of friction between the two nations is an incident in which Brazil negotiated with Iran in 2010, despite explicit U.S. instructions not to interact with Iran. Economically, Brazil has been working to exclude the U.S. from South America through economic integration unions such as Mercosur and was the main opponent of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in addition to raising tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods. Further, Brazil has worked to actively oppose U.S. actions. Brazil has opposed American anti-drug lord operations in Colombia and has even insisted that any American military actions in South America be approved by Brazil first. Brazil has also opposed most recent U.S. foreign policy, particularly the War on Terror, the invasion of Libya and the U.S. attempt to pass a UN Security Council resolution condemning Syria. Overall, Brazil’s attitude towards the U.S. is one of suspicion: Brazil regards the U.S. as an obstacle to its rise and thus is unfriendly towards the U.S.13

The United States ought to undertake a two-pronged approach to protecting its interests from Brazil. First, the U.S. needs to reach out to Brazil in order to show the Brazilian government that American interests and values are aligned with those of Brazil. Value-wise, both countries are Western-style republics that value democracy and liberty. Brazil benefits from the security provided to it by U.S. hegemony and is made wealthy by the freedom of navigation the U.S. Navy provides. The U.S. should try to convince the Brazilian leadership, through state visits and possibly through incentives such as subsidies for sugar-cane based biofuels from Brazil, that U.S. hegemony benefits Brazil. Second, the U.S. must try to peacefully frustrate Brazilian regional hegemony. This can be done in two ways: by assisting South American nations that are opposed to Brazil and by creating an alternative to Mercosur. Already, Brazil’s rise has hit opposition from several South American countries, particularly Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia. The U.S. can reach out to Colombia by providing more assistance in attacking drug operations there and by increasing trade to Colombia, which would pull the country away from Brazil. Likewise, U.S. investment in developing Bolivian resources, particularly in the emerging and strategic lithium industry, could make the U.S. Bolivia’s main trading partner and thus bring Bolivia out of Brazil’s shadow. Although Colombia and Bolivia are the two pieces of low-hanging fruit, efforts to strengthen ties with South American nations to weaken Brazil’s grip on the region must be made with most South American countries. The centerpiece of this weakening of Brazilian hegemony should be the creation of an alternative to Mercosur. Mercosur is already faltering, as it is becoming obvious that the organization exists solely as a means to further Brazilian power and not to promote free trade.3 If the U.S. were to create a free-trade organization in South America incorporating the Mercosur countries and other South American nations, this would tie South America to the U.S. instead of Brazil, especially if this free-trade organization was more of a free-trade organization than Mercosur is. Inevitable Brazilian opposition to such an organization can be circumvented by offering membership to the other Mercosur nations first, and then letting peer pressure kick in.

Brazil’s rise cannot be halted, nor should it be. However, Brazil’s economic strength need not imply regional hegemony, a fact that can be ensured by increased U.S. involvement in South America. 

Pictured above: A Brazilian oil platform, the first to tap the massive and newly discovered "sugar loaf" deposit off of Brazil's coast. Platforms like this one will catapult Brazil into the ranks of the world's largest oil producers and ensure Brazilian economic growth for decades.

Citations

1. "Brazil." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 6 Feb. 2012.

2. International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. N.p.: n.p., 2011. IMF.org. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

3. The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography. N.p.: STRATFOR, n.d. Print.

4.  Clemons, Benedict. The Real Plan, Poverty, and Income Distribution in Brazil. N.p.: IMF, 1997. Finance and Development. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

5. Pielow, Christian. "Brazil – A New Future." The Executive Search Blog. Blue Steps, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

6. "Filling Up the Future." The Economist 5 Nov. 2011: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

7.  "A Big Oil Discovery." The Economist 12 Feb. 2008: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

8. Shifter, Michael. "Argentina-Brazil Relations." World Politics Review. Trend Lines, 22 Dec. 2010. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

9. "Brazil reiterates support for Argentina, denies any blockade to the Falklands." MercoPress 1 Feb. 2012: n. pag. MercoPress South Atlantic News Agency. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

10. Varas, Augusto. Brazil in South America: From Indifference to Hegemony. N.p.: FRIDE, 2008. FRIDE. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.

11. "Speak Softly and Carry a Blank Cheque." The Economist 15 July 2010: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.

12. Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Luiz. "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations withthe United States." Latin American Perspectives 33.3 (2006): 12-27.JSTOR. Web. 7 Apr. 2012. .

13. Hakim, Peter. "Why the US and Brazil Can't Get Along – A Story of Turf, Ideology, and Interests." Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica (Mar. 2011): n.pag. Inter-American Dialogue. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.
14.  "Brazil News." The New York Times 7 Dec. 2010: n. pag. The New York Times. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

U.S. Navy and small craft: Part II

In my last post, I explained why small boats are not as big of a threat as many pundits claim. My post may have came across as categorically opposed to all small craft. That is not the case. Instead, I shall argue that small vessels have a big role in our modern Navy, and how they can best serve our fleet.

Previously, I showed how small craft are not particularly good at combating larger vessels. However, small boats are not limited only to harassing larger ships, they can serve some very important purposes as well. These roles have historically included tasks such as patrol of the littorals, fleet scouting, counter-piracy operations, acting as a courier, escorting ships, and interception of couriers. Of these, interception of couriers (particularly drug-running craft today) and counter-piracy operations are probably the most relevant today, since scouting and patrol of the coast are already handled by aircraft and the Coast Guard, respectively, and courier operations are more effectively carried out by invisible submarines or fast jets. Although escorting convoys is an important role warships must play, it is not particularly relevant in this time of global maritime peace.

These requirements for a small warship (counter-piracy and interception of drug-runners with a minor focus on convoy escorting) are further compounded by the nature of the modern U.S. Navy. The Navy operates around the world, which requires all of its boats, including so-called littoral craft, to be able to sail in the open ocean to reach far-flung crisis zones. Further, the wide variety of threats that the Navy faces means that any warship that Navy launches must be multirole.

In addition, the need for a small warship to counter-act the threats of piracy and drug running is immediate. The Navy regularly trumpets that it exists to further freedom of the seas, and right now, the only impediment to freedom of navigation is piracy. The Navy's current fleet, which was largely designed to defeat the Soviets, is wholly inadequate for this task: most Arleigh Burke destroyers are not even equipped with the helicopters or boats necessary for stopping pirate skiffs. Further, pirate craft (and by extension, drug running vessels, which are even faster than pirate vessels) have proven that they are capable of outrunning and out-maneuvering Navy ships. The Navy's huge, billion plus dollar destroyers are also far too expensive for the task of countering piracy or drug-running.

Of course, the Navy is always several steps ahead of me: the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, which has produced two rival ship classes: the Freedom class and the Independence class, has created vessels to address these needs. Although the two ships have received an unreasonable amount of hatred in both Navy circles and on the internet, I shall argue that they are the best boats we could have purchased, for their purpose.

The LCS ships are well suited to the tasks of countering piracy and drug traffic. Both are fast, clocking in at 47 knots for the Freedom and 44 for the Independence. This makes them the fastest ships in the Navy, and as fast as some of the boats they attempt to defeat. [1] Further, the ships are highly maneuverable: both are equipped with independently-steerable water jets, which allow the LCS to turn on a dime, an ability that has been demonstrated in sea trials. [2]. The ships are also seaworthy enough to make long voyages on their own, owing to their high stability in choppy seas [3] and their ranges of roughly 1,500 nm. [4] The ships are equipped with the latest detection equipment, and carry 1-2 helicopters as well as Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) for intercepting pirate, terrorist, or drug running boats.

What makes the LCS unique, however, is their weapons systems. Besides the usual weapons (a naval gun, machine guns, and a CIWS system) the ships are customizable, that is, their main armament can vary depending on the situation at hand, with customization taking less than 48 hours [3]. This allows the LCS to be a minesweeper one day, a subchaser the next, and an air-defense corvette the day after. This customization allows the LCS to fulfill its requirement of being multirole while avoiding the need to carry weapons of all types and thus be a jack of all trades: decent at everything but good at nothing. The success of customizable warships has already been demonstrated with the Royal Danish Navy's Absalon class support ships: large amphibious support vessels that have been used successfully in counter-piracy operations. [5].

Critics assail the Navy for not purchasing the excellent corvettes and patrol boats already on the market, an offense they say is particularly heinous since many corvettes and patrol boats are made here in the U.S. They further point to how useless the LCS would be if forced to fight warships from another nation. However, these arguments miss the point of the LCS: if the Navy wanted a corvette or a patrol boat, it would have bought one. Patrol boats are built to defend the coast (a task taken care of by the Coast Guard and Air Force in the U.S.), while corvettes are intended to fight in a fleet against other ships or land installations, in a manner similar to missile boats or torpedo boats. The LCS is supposed to be a fast counter piracy and drug running ship that can serve as an corvette or minesweeper in a pinch. The LCS is quick, maneuverable, and small (both in terms of overall size and draft), giving it the advantages of a patrol boat in combating small craft. At the same time, it is long range and powerful, giving it the advantages of a corvette. Finally, it has its own, unique advantages over other vessels: its capabilities are not as spread thin as those of a corvette because of its customizability.

In effect, the LCS is the perfect warship for its role. It saves money by taking the role of numerous other ships: minesweepers, fast attack craft, subchasers, patrol craft, etc. It excels in what it does because of its maneuverability, powerful armament, and speed. It can sail great distances in open seas to protect merchant vessels in times of war. And it fills a big gap in U.S. naval capabilities by providing an effective means of defeating fast speedboats and pirates.



Cites
1. http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0918/p05s01-woam.html
2. http://archive.decaturdaily.com/decaturdaily/news/060612/ships.shtml
3.Navy Littoral Comabt Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress. Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs. Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2011
4. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/
5. http://politiken.dk/indland/article691125.ece