U.S. Navy and small craft: Part I

Every few years, the naval brass fret about a new supposedly unbeatable threat to U.S. naval supremacy. In the late '90s, it was diesel-electric submarines. In the last decade, it was Chinese anti-shipping missiles. And right now, the fear of the moment is Iranian small craft. Much of this fear was sparked by a highly-publicized 2002 war game that predicted that the Navy would lose catastrophically in a battle with Iranian small craft. While the methodology of said war game is dubious (see my earlier post on Iran), something still needs to be done to improve the capabilities of the Navy in combating small craft.

It is always prudent to consult history, particularly here. Small warships are as old as naval combat itself, but until recently, small vessels were unable to challenge larger ships because they lacked sufficient stability and freeboard to sail in the ocean, as well as sufficient firepower to even dent the armor of larger vessels, they posed no threat to large surface combatants. This changed in 1866 by the invention of the torpedo, which allowed small boats to successfully defeat much larger battleships. The subsequent introduction of the torpedo boat in 1877 created a panic in naval circles since it was believed that swarms of torpedo boats would allow tiny nations to lay waste to huge, expensive fleets, forever upsetting the balance of power. However, as Mahan observed, these boats were akin to fire-ships in that they were effective at striking fear into the enemy but not very effective at sinking ships. Torpedo boats suffered from the same fates as earlier small craft, plus some new ones: they were dangerous in open waters, had short ranges, could only engage enemy ships effectively at short ranges (at which point they would be ripped up by low-caliber guns), and were too small to carry advanced aiming devices or range finders, a fault that doomed them to inaccuracy. Indeed, early torpedo boats were almost total failures: torpedoes boats in the Russo-Japanese war only sunk one ship that had already been rendered crippled and immobile by battleship fire, and improved torpedo boats in WWI still only sunk one cruiser in the entire war. The destroyer, originally built to defend fleets against the torpedo boat, had largely replaced the torpedo boat by WWI since destroyers were more seaworthy, had a longer range, carried better detection equipment and, most importantly, had guns and depth charges to provide adequate defenses against submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. This trend continued through WWII, where torpedo boats were hampered by increased fleet speeds (which denied torpedo boats the speed and agility advantage they had long relied on) and long-range patrol aircraft, which could detect and defeat torpedo boats before they even came close to an enemy fleet.

Postwar, small vessels again underwent a renaissance. The invention of the guided missile, coupling with the shrinking of electronics, particularly radar, gave rise to the missile boat, a type of fast, short range boat designed to sink larger ships with swarm tactics and then escape speedily. Some larger missile boats could even carry close in weapons systems (CIWS) to defend against enemy missiles and SAMs to protect against aircraft, which ought to have taken away the main liability of torpedo boats: their extreme vulnerability. Initially, it looked as if missile boats were the huge threats that torpedo boats were supposed to be. This is illustrated by several events, especially the famous sinking of the Israeli frigate Eilat by an Egyptian Osa-class missile boat in 1967; the destruction of four Pakistani ships, including a destroyer and two large merchantmen, by Indian missile boats in 1971; and the sinking of five Syrian missile boats by six Israeli missile boats at the Battle of Latakia (the first battle between two fleets of missile boats) in 1973. However, it must be borne in mind that in all three of these engagements, the losers were primarily obsolete ships that lacked defensive countermeasures. The effectiveness of countermeasures, particularly CIWS guns and missiles, has been well demonstrated: the successful use of electronic countermeasures and chaff by the Israelis at Latakia and the effective use of CIWS missiles to defeat anti-ship missiles by the Royal Navy in the Falklands War provide two good examples. Finally, missile boats are still extraordinarily vulnerable to attacks from aircraft and surface ships. To wit, NATO helicopters made short work of the Iraqi Navy's missile craft in the Gulf War, and the U.S. Navy destroyed three Iranian speedboats and one Iranian gunship with aircraft and ship launched missiles in Operation Praying Mantis while taking no casualties.

So the threat posed by Iranian speedboats may not be so dire after all. However, the fact that Iranian speedboats could potentially pose a threat means that the U.S. Navy must create a means by which to defeat this threat. A strategy for defeating Iranian missile boats must be both offensive and defensive: that is, the Navy must be able to both sink Iranian boats and defend itself against attacks by them.

The offensive aspect of fighting Iranian boats is mostly already taken care of. Combat air patrol can be expected to detect incoming Iranian craft and fire on them. However, because Iranian missile boats are small and fairly stealthy, they may be difficult to detect from high altitudes. Thus, it would be prudent to devote a small portion of a carrier's combat air patrol to low-altitude searches for Iranian boats. As the success of helicopter operations against Iraqi missile boats in the Gulf War demonstrates, helicopters can provide a valuable defense against missile boats. However, a helicopter is useless if it is not armed, so the Navy must have its anti-submarine and patrol helicopters carry some kind of light anti-ship missile such as the AGM-65 Maverick (I choose the Maverick because it is currently in U.S. Navy inventory and since its effectiveness against small craft was already demonstrated in the Gulf War) while in the Persian Gulf. Further, surface ships can effectively defeat missile boats using their light guns and anti-aircraft missiles. However, surface ships are useless if they do not detect Iranian craft, so it must be ensured that all Navy ships are equipped with the very latest sensors, and that these sensors are always on.

The main area of concern regarding Iranian missile boats is defense. U.S. Navy vessels are equipped with highly advanced CIWS and electronic countermeasures, which ought to provide adequate defenses against Iranian boats. All Navy ships ought to be equipped with these CIWS guns and electronic countermeasures (ECM). Some ships that currently carry CIWS and ECM ought to carry more of it, particularly the Arleigh Burke flight IIa destroyers (which only carry 1 Phalanx CIWS gun, and ought to carry 2 to give them protection fore and aft) and the Nimitz, Enterprise and Gerald R. Ford class carriers, which all could benefit from more CIWS guns and missiles located in more locations on the ships, to give the carriers 360 degree defensive coverage and redundancy in defenses so that if one CIWS system fails, another can take its place. Also, the U.S. Navy needs to avoid the fate of the INS Hanit (an Israeli corvette hit by a missile because she forgot to activate her countermeasures) and keep ECM and CIWS ready to use at all times, in addition to keeping sensors running at all times to ensure long-range detection of enemy combatants. Finally, to prevent "swarm" attacks, in which vast numbers of small boats overwhelm larger ships by forcing the latter to expend all of their defensive weapons on endless waves of boats, the Navy needs to upgrade all ships to carry AESA radar, which can track more targets than current radars can. Further, U.S. warships ought to carry more ammunition for all of their weapons in order to not get overwhelmed by large numbers of enemies.

Thus, the supposedly lethal threat of Iranian speedboats may not be so scary after all. History has shown that small craft never live up to expectations. The Navy currently has the means to defend itself against any number of small craft attacks, and it can be expected to do so in the event of a conflict. It is probably now time for the naval brass to start looking for the next unbeatable threat to naval supremacy.

It was ok to kill al-Aulaqi

There has been a lot of controversy lately surrounding Attorney General Eric Holder's speech in which he defended the Obama administration's killing of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi. Holder argues in his speech that due process does not imply judicial process, i.e. a trial, since judicial process is not specified in the Constitution. Although he is correct, since the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that due process is liberty, not judicial process, this is a highly unwise argument to make, since many Americans view due process as referring to judicial process. Holder regrettably ignored the many valid and popular justifications for the legality of the killing of al-Aulaqi.

One argument leveled against the Obama administration is that al-Aulaqi was merely a terrorist sympathizer, not a combatant, so his killing was not justified under the laws of war, which only permit the killing of enemy combatants. This calls for a little background information. Al-Aulaqi, a former radical Islamic imam and al-Qaeda propagandist, was also a direct planner of terrorist attacks. In the failed Christmas Day Bombing of 2009, al-Aulaqi not only advocated for the attack, but he helped plan the attack and supply the perpetrator. As RAND counter-terrorism expert Seth Jones said, "Al-Awlaki actually helped get him [the bomber] in a jihadi camp, helped him get access to the underwear bomb and then actually walked him through [it]. He wanted [the bomber] to wait to explode [the bomb] over American airspace." He further instructed the bomber on how to evade capture. In addition, Al-Aulaqi had communicated regularly with Maj. Nidal Hasan, the man responsible for the deaths of 13 U.S. soldiers at Fort Hood, and had not only encouraged Maj. Hasan to carry out the attack, he gave Maj. Hasan his personal blessing to carry out the attack. In the words of al-Aulaqi, "[I] blessed the act because it was against a military target." Going further back, one can see ties between al-Aulaqi and 9/11. In early 2000, al-Aulaqi met with several of the 9/11 hijackers, including Khalid al-Mihdhar, both al-Hazmi brothers, and one other unidentified hijacker. In February of that same year, al-Aulaqi made four calls to Oman al-Bayoumi, who assisted the hijackers, although the FBI is confident that Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were using al-Bayoumi's at the time. Ominously, al-Aulaqi  After the attacks, al-Aulaqi admitted to the FBI of having met with Nawaf al-Hazmi several times, although he did not tell the FBI what they discussed.

Although the above is already a fairly damning implication of al-Aulaqi in terrorism, the acts detailed above are only those in which al-Aulaqi had a direct involvement. His indirect involvement, in the form of radicalizing Muslims and then inspiring them to do terror, has had a far greater impact: he inspired or aided the Times Square bomb plot, the 2010 British Airlines bomb plot, and the 2009 Little Rock recruitment office attack, to name a few. Although some claim that al-Aulaqi acted as a journalist or commentator when he advocated violence against Americans (in the same way that O'Reilly is considered a commentator instead of a combatant despite his calls for war with Iran), this claim ignores al-Aulaqi's direct involvement in inspiring people to kill (many terrorists have cited al-Aulaqi as their inspiration), his recruitment campaigns for al-Qaeda, the fact that he both advocates and plans terror in his speeches (one of his most famous pamphlets, 44 ways to support jihad, calls on Muslims to finance and join jihadi organizations and to undergo weapons training), and his membership in al-Qaeda. These facts, particularly the last one, mean that al-Aulaqi is more similar to a military recruiter, military chaplain, or senior officer than to a journalist. These clear ties to al-Qaeda make it hard to argue that al-Aulaqi is a civilian.

There is also the legality aspect. Critics of the killing of al-Aulaqi argue that it is illegal to kill a U.S. citizen without due process. However, because the U.S. is at war with al-Qaeda, al-Aulaqi's organization, al-Aulaqi is effectively an enemy combatant. U.S. law allows for the killing of the killing of enemy combatants regardless of their citizenship, so this killing was justified. Although it can be argued that the U.S. could just call anyone a terrorist and thus justify killing them, al-Qaeda is a serious enough threat to justify calling them an enemy, as Maj. Matthew Machon and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights explain, "Statman claims that the United States is entitled to classify operations against al-Qaeda as war...based upon two specific criteria: (a) the gravity of the threat posed by al Qaeda and (b) the impracticality of coping with this threat by conventional law-enforcing institutions and methods. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report on Terrorism and Human Rights in 2002 appears to agree[s] with the assessment of Statman." Maj. Machon is right on both fronts: al-Qaeda has killed over 5,000 Americans, and intimidation of juries and witnesses by terrorist groups plus the difficulty of finding 100% conclusive evidence of al-Qaeda membership makes trials of terrorists almost impossible.

Part (b), the impracticality of law-enforcement, applies particularly well to al-Aulaqi's case. His location in Yemen, deep in the heart of an al-Qaeda stronghold, would have made his capture difficult if not impossible. Trying al-Aulaqi would have just given him an opportunity to rant about his political beliefs for hours, and the fact that he is not a trigger-puller but a support-member in al-Qaeda would make him difficult to convict, especially since civilian courts have a tendency to clear terrorists of their charges (see: Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani).

Finally, al-Aulaqi will not set a precedent for killing Americans. In the U.S. Civil War, the Confederates were all former U.S. citizens, and yet they were killed. Indeed, some Northerners defected to the South, and yet some of them were still killed by Union troops. This precedent of the U.S. being allowed to kill Americans who try to destroy America has been around since 1861, and yet we have not been plunged into a fascist dictatorship. This proves that the U.S. only attacks organizations that pose a great threat to its security, and al-Qaeda is one of those organizations.

So to recap: al-Aulaqi was a confirmed enemy combatant who was directly responsible for several attacks on U.S. citizens and was indirectly responsible for the deaths of many others. His status as a combatant invalidates any claims he could have had to a civilian trial, and the impossibility of capturing him made the drone strike the only viable option.

One State in Israel?

Hamas fired rockets leave Gaza for Israel.

  
  There is a lot of debate in the media about what to do with Israel and Palestine. Terrorists and violent protesters in the West Bank and Gaza are fighting for Palestinian statehood, while Israeli security forces take actions to secure the safety of their citizens and their right to the area. The best solution to this crisis there would be to allow Israel to take over both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, since it would be a legal action that would help the Palestinians.

    First, the Palestinians have no right to the land. Legitimate rule is contingent upon the ability of the state to keep its people safe both from itself and from foreign powers. The fact that Israel is able to build all of its settlements in the first place without any action from the Palestinian Authority just goes to show that the Palestinian Authority is not strong enough to be considered the legitimate owner of the West Bank. The West Bank is governed by an ineffective and bankrupt state, the Palestinian Authority, that is unable to provide even the most basic health care and education to its people.1 The Palestinian Authority's corruption is largely self-caused, since poor relations between Hamas and Fatah caused the Palestinian Authority to become so bitterly divided between Hamas supporters and Fatah supporters that the government simply could not function. The Gaza Strip is governed by Hamas, which is classified as a terrorist organization by the State Department, and with good reason: it massacres its political opponents2, uses civilians as human shields2, and has dedicated itself to the destruction of Israel.

    In addition, there would be numerous benefits to allowing Israel to take control over the West Bank and Gaza. Israel is a modern democracy with functioning legal institutions, rights for women, halfway decent education systems, welfare institutions, and some basic civil liberties and rights3. Israel has a booming economy that is entrepreneur driven3, so a unification of Israel and Palestine would help lift Palestinians out of poverty. Although there is anti-Palestinian discrimination in Israel, discrimination in Palestine is as severe or worse, although it is directed at different targets. For example, enforcement of Shari’a in some areas of Palestine have caused women there to have virtually no rights4, and the disabled are discriminated against equally heavily5. Israeli security forces can provide real law enforcement, and could effectively defeat terrorists. An Israeli takeover would dramatically boost the Palestine standard of living, and give them freedoms that a Palestinian state would not be able to offer. It is thus not surprising that polls show that most Arabs in East Jerusalem who have experienced the benefits of Israeli welfare, education and health care want to live in Israel instead of Palestine.6

    Contrast this with Palestine. The Palestinian economy is nearly entirely agricultural, with some small industries, making it barely a developing nation. The main barrier to prosperity there is costly and limited access to capital thanks to government policies, and nearly all economic growth has been caused by foreign aid instead of private sector development. The Palestinian Authority, the government that controls Palestine, is swamped with debts, causing it to cut welfare and raise prices on things like power. Unemployment stands at 25% in the West Bank and 40% in Gaza, compared with 5.6%% in Israel.7 Health care in Palestine is a failure: infant mortality is high compared to the rest of the Arab world, treatable non-communicable diseases are the leading cause of death, and thousands of Palestinians are forced to seek health care in other nations due to the lack of health care in much of Palestine.1

    Thus Israel should take the Palestinian territories under her wing to rescue the Palestinian citizens from the oppressive regime of Hamas and the useless Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and raise them up to a modern standard of living.

Cites
1. Mataria, Awad, et al. Heath in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 5. N.p.: n.p.,
    2009. Print. 5.
2. Under Cover of War: Hamas Political Violence in Gaza. New York City: Human
    Rights Watch, 2009. Print.
3. Oren, Michael. "The Ultimate Ally." Foreign Policy. Washington Post, May-June 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. .
4. Facts on Violence Against Women in Palestine. Jerusalem: MIFTAH, 2005. Print.
5. Amro, Nuereddin. "From discrimination to an inclusive future for the visually handicapped in Palestine." Strong Voices. N.p., 6 Dec. 2011. Web. 10 Feb.2012. .
6. Diehl, Jackson. "Why Palestinians want to be Israeli citizens." Post Partisan.Washignton Post, 12 Jan. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. .
7. "West Bank." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 18 Jan. 2012. Web. 6 Feb. 2012. .

North Korea's clever ruse

Three days ago, North Korea agreed to cease its nuclear and missile tests, as well as to let International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors visit its nuclear enrichment site at Yongbyon. This announcement has been hailed as a revolution in North Korean-U.S. relations. That may not be the case.

First of all, this is no dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea's nuclear weapons aren't going anywhere, and testing isn't entirely necessary for the endurance of a functioning nuclear program. The U.S.' last test was in 1992, Russia's last one was in 1990, and neither India nor Pakistan has tested a weapon since 1998, yet no one would claim that any of those countries have poor quality nuclear programs. There are ways to test nuclear weapons without actually detonating the weapon (for example, by testing each individual part to ensure that it works), and it seems probable that the North Koreans will do this. Further, missiles can be tested by reconfiguring them as space-launch systems and then launching satellites into orbit, so North Korea's missile tests may not even be halted.

Second, North Korea's promise to allow IAEA to visit the Yongbyon site is meaningless for a number of reasons. There may be a number of hidden nuclear facilities in North Korea, and even if there are not, Yongbyon is just one nuclear facility, so the expected results from these IAEA inspections will most likely be negligible. Regardless, there is no unique benefit to these IAEA inspections, since Yongbyon has been subject to annual inspections from American nuclear physicist Dr. Sigfried Hecker since 2004.

Finally, the only benefactor from this deal is Kim Jong-un and his regime. Kim will be popular at home since he has secured at least 242,000 tons of much needed food aid for his people without sacrificing the popular nuclear program, breaking a decades-long famine there; and he will be popular abroad because this deal makes it look like Kim is giving up his nuclear program and putting the interests of his people before his own. Meanwhile, North Korea is as confrontational as ever, evidenced by Kim's threat of "divine war" in retaliation for South Korea's military exercises that have started today. The U.S. has just lost one of its biggest bargaining chips with North Korea, food aid, and North Korea will gain undeserved international respect for appearing to have sacrificed its nuclear program. This is the biggest failure in U.S.-North Korean relations in recent history.