What next, Mr. President?

The President waves to the crowd before his 2012 acceptance speech.

    On Nov. 6, Barack Obama secured a second term as President of the United States of America. While I congratulate Obama on his victory, I must ask: what exactly, Mr. President, will you do in the next four years?
    The focus of Obama’s reelection campaign was the economy, so it is reasonable to assume that he will make strengthening the economy his top priority. The centerpiece of the President’s first-term economic policy was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (i.e. the stimulus), which made long-term investments in infrastructure, green energy, education and manufacturing. Obama plans to enact another, smaller stimulus in his second term, named the American Jobs Act, which will cut income and payroll taxes and increase infrastructure and education spending. The rest of his economic plan consists of an overhaul of the tax code and investments in energy. Obama promises to raise the capital gains tax (a tax on investments and stocks held for more than one year that primarily affects the wealthy) from 15 to 20 percent and to raise taxes on the top two tax brackets from 33 and 35 percent to 36 and 39.6 percent, respectively. His tax plan also includes promises to eliminate loopholes and to streamline the tax code for businesses and individuals. The plan specifies to phase out loopholes for those with incomes over $200,000 and to eliminate several loopholes for large companies, although how it plans to streamline the tax code remains unclear. He also aims to create or extend numerous tax credits for individuals and businesses, such as a $3,000 credit per each worker hired for businesses, cut the corporate tax rate, eliminate the current tax credit for outsourcing and extend the Bush tax cuts and other tax cuts and credits for individuals making less than $200,000 per year.

The President’s energy policy in his next term will be similar to his first term’s energy policy. Obama plans to focus primarily on funding alternative energy while also expanding access to cheap hydrocarbons. He aims to raise fuel efficiency requirements for vehicles, set a requirement that all utilities must produce 80 percent of their electricity by 2035, continue funding and supporting the alternative energy industry and increase gas, oil and coal production by opening up some public lands to drilling and encouraging hydraulic fracking (a new, controversial type of natural gas extraction) while insisting on higher environmental safeguards for drilling and fracking.

    For the President, economic policy and fiscal policy dovetail, which is why he has proposed a plan for cutting the deficit. His plan for reducing the deficit centers around an 80-page deficit reduction plan that he drafted in 2011. Obama calls for raising taxes on the wealthy by eliminating the capital gains tax, raising marginal income tax rates and eliminating loopholes for the wealthy. The plan also incorporates spending cuts. Obama plans to cut $257 billion from discretionary spending, primary by cutting subsidies to agriculture and the oil industry. He will also cut $450 billion from the defense budget, try to cut Medicare’s budget by negotiating with pharmaceutical companies to lower drug prices and to levy an additional Social Security tax of 2-4 percent on those with incomes over $200,000 to try to make Social Security solvent, among other things. According to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this budget will cut the debt by $2 trillion and increase GDP growth by 0.6 percent, although the President’s opponents point out that his budget adds $4 trillion to the deficit when compared to the CBO’s baseline budget, which includes the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and sequestration (an imminent series of spending cuts). Despite his willingness to cut the deficit, Obama has stated that he will try to prevent the impending “fiscal cliff” (i.e. the impending combination of the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and sequestration), which is projected by the CBO to put the economy back into recession. Like much of Obama’s economic policy, however, his deficit plan is unlikely to pass through the Republican-controlled House.

Indeed, because the Democrats do not control Congress, the only thing that Obama can be guaranteed to do in his second term is to cement the achievements of his first term. Two of his main accomplishments, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), a banking and financial sector reform law and the Affordable Care Act, still have major provisions that need to be implemented. The main achievement of Dodd-Frank was to require regulatory agencies and new committees set up by the law to draft and enact certain regulations of the financial sector. Only one-half of these rules have been drafted however, so Obama will have to fight to get the rest of the regulations drafted. Similarly, most of the important provisions of the Affordable Care Act, including the individual mandate and the ban on gender discrimination by insurance companies, will be enacted in 2014. Since several states are already trying to fight these provisions through both legislation and governor decree, Obama will have to fight, using the courts, personal influence over state governments and possibly legislation, to ensure that the main provisions of healthcare reform get enacted.

On social policy, Obama supports gay rights, gender equality and immigration reform. The most important social policy for Obama is women’s rights, judging by the amount of focus he placed on it in his first term. The President aims to expand free contraceptive access to women, pass the Paycheck Fairness Act, which aims to make it easier for victims of wage discrimination to discover if they are being discriminated against and to seek justice and to try to pass other bills that combat sexual violence and wage discrimination. The President believes that women should be allowed to get abortions, so he will likely oppose potential legislation that restricts access to abortions, both in Congress and at the state level. In terms of gay rights issues, Obama supports legalization of same-sex marriage, although how he plans to achieve this is unclear, as it can only be accomplished by amending the Constitution. He also plans to enact the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (which bans hiring discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity) and repeal the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as between a man and a woman for federal purposes. On the issue of immigration, the President’s platform notes his support for reforming and streamlining the immigration process, although his platform lists no explicit reforms. He is a noted supporter of the DREAM Act, which would provide illegal immigrants who are students or soldiers in America with permanent residency status, and he would probably make trying to pass the DREAM Act his biggest goal as far as immigration is concerned. Since he has described his failure to pass the the DREAM Act as the biggest failure of his first term, it is reasonable to expect that he will make pushing for the DREAM Act one of his top priorities in his second term.

Although Obama fought for all of these issues in his first term, the extent to which he would be able to achieve them in his second term is limited due to both the limited Constitutional role of the President and the fact that the House is controlled by Republicans. The most important way that Obama can influence social policy is through whom he appoints to the Supreme Court. Four justices are in their late 70s and are thus likely to retire. The Court, which is split 5-4, is set to rule on cases concerning the constitutionality of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, the constitutionality of affirmative action and California’s Proposition 8, among other important social issues, so who Obama appoints to the Court will have long-lasting effects on social issues.

The foreign policy of Obama’s second term, like his first term, will be centered on slowly ending the War on Terror while preparing to face other, more long-term threats. Obama’s primary foreign policy challenge in his next term will be to ensure that the 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan goes well. The success of the withdrawal will be contingent on whether Afghan security forces are able to fight terrorism on their own in 2014 and whether the Afghan government will be able to become functioning, strong and non-corrupt, so the President will likely focus on making these things happen in his second term. Even after the Afghanistan withdrawal, Obama will have to continue to fight terrorism. He will probably continue his policy of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, and will have to manage the backlash and opposition that they generate, although he has offered no specifics.

The President’s primary foreign policy plan is to shift American power away from the Middle East and towards Asia. The centerpiece of this effort will be to continue the “pivot” to Asia, which is the rebalancing of American power (especially military power) towards East Asia and especially China. The President promises to shift 60 percent of our military strength to Asia by 2020, an effort that is already underway, and to attack China’s allegedly unfair trade policies, although he probably will not do so due to the risk of starting a trade war. He also will likely reach out to American allies in East Asia, especially India, and continue to invest in military hardware for South Korea and Japan. Unfortunately, he has offered few specifics on other major foreign policy issues, including Iran, the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the economic crisis in Europe. Judging from his first-term’s record, Obama will likely try to reach out to Brazil and India, increase sanctions on Iran while continuing both covert military actions against Iran and create efforts to find a diplomatic way to remove Iran’s nuclear weapons and ignore the crisis in Europe.

Barack Obama has a difficult four years ahead of him. He will have to fix the economy, prevent the deficit from spiraling further out of control, protect the rights of minorities and refocus our foreign policy towards long-term threats, all while having to battle strong Republican opposition in Congress. I wish him good luck. He’ll need it.

Militarism 2.0: South China Sea

Chinese destroyer Qingdao enters Pearl Harbor in 2006. The fact that she was able to make this long journey demonstrates the high endurance of Chinese warships.

A specter is haunting Asia – the specter of war. Across the continent, from India to Japan, formerly peaceful countries are pursuing aggressive and occasionally expansionist policies. While expansionism is not new in the region, this time is different. Previous conflicts in Asia tended to feature one modern and well-armed nation conquering smaller and weaker ones, as in the rise of Tang China in the 7th century or Imperial Japan in the 20th century. This time, however, there are several different sides involved in a potential run-up to war. Aggressive statements from political leaders are just the public face of the looming crisis. The region is haunted by nationalism, energy disputes, and, most ominously, an arms race.

Arms Race

Since the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions are defined by the sea, this arms race is primarily naval. Although military spending in Asia grew at a slower rate than usual because of the poor state of the economy, Asian military budgets grew by an average of 2.3 percent in 2011.1 While this may not sound like a very large increase, it is significant because military spending in the rest of the world has hit a plateau, which makes Asia the region with the second biggest increase in military spending, after the Middle East.2 Asia’s military buildup is more visible over the long term, as spending has risen 69 percent since 2000, compared to a global increase of 49 percent.3 This is especially concerning because the U.S. and most of its Western European allies are cutting their defense budgets to rein in rising deficits.4

The two countries largely responsible for this jump in spending are also the world’s largest: India and China. By 2030, India plans to spend $45 billion on its navy and add 103 ships to its fleet; China plans to spend $20 billion and add 135 ships. India is the world’s largest arms importer, accounting for nine percent of all global arms trade.5

   

More important than just the numbers of ships India and China plan to acquire, however, is the types of ships they will build and weapons they are buying. Both countries have explicitly stated a desire to own “blue-water” navies,” (fleets that can fight and project power more than 200 miles from their home countries) and are thus investing in power projection weapons, particularly aircraft carriers. India is currently building two new 40,000 ton carriers, is planning to launch a 65,000 ton carrier by 2017, and has purchased $700 million worth of MiG-29ks (Russian carrier-based fighters).6 China, meanwhile, has just launched its first carrier, a refitted 33,000 ton Gorbachev-era ex-Soviet vessel and plans to build four more.7

 

Carriers are useful for projecting influence and fighting conflicts a long distance away from their bases, which makes them exceptionally well suited to power projection and controlling regions. It is worrying that China and India are expressing increased interest in these vessels, since it shows that they likely intend to establish firm spheres of influence in the region using threats of force.

American and Indian aircraft fly over the Indian aircraft carrier INS Viraat.

India and China are interested in another power projection tool recently: amphibious warfare ships, which can transport Marines and launch D-Day style assaults on beaches. India bought its first amphibious warfare ship, an outdated U.S. Navy vessel, last year and plans to acquire four newer ships,8 and China owns two modern (circa 2006) and domestically built amphibious warfare ships and plans to build eight more.9

   

Both nations are also investing in the crucial yet inconspicuous aspects of power projection: support vessels (underway replenishment ships, oilers, tankers, etc) and foreign bases. The Indian Navy has just acquired two new tankers and two underway replenishment and ammunition ships, and it has reportedly conducted underway replenishment operations.10 China has owned an extensive fleet of tankers and support ships since the ‘90s and has been stepping up the rate of exercises involving them after 2005.11 Much has been made of China’s “string of pearls,” a string of new naval bases and deepwater ports from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Myanmar and Cambodia.12 While the Indian Navy does not yet have as many bases as China, it has built a new base in Madagascar, has berthing rights in Oman and Vietnam, and is negotiating with the Maldives to build a base there.13

Although most emphasis is placed on construction of power projection weapons, offensive weaponry is also being stockpiled by both nations.

India and China are building fleets of modern, stealth frigates and destroyers. These new surface ships are heavily armed and carry some of the most advanced electronics, including Active Electronically Scanned Array radars, which are nearly impossible to jam and can track far more targets than regular radars.14 The most important aspect of these new ships, however, is that they are high endurance: China’s Type 052 destroyers have a range of 4,000 nautical miles15 and India’s Delhi class have a range of 5,000 nautical miles.16

           Acquisition of silent diesel-electric submarines and better armed nuclear submarines, both of which are purely offensive weapons, is also a priority for both countries. India is currently buying the latest submarines from Germany and Russia and is planning to launch 30 new boats by 2030,17 and China has added 42 boats of increasing stealthiness to its fleet since 1995, and expects to add a total of 75 boats by 2020.18

Finally, both countries are upgrading their missile inventories: India has equipped all destroyers and frigates with the stealthy, supersonic, mid-range (290 km), and powerful (armed with a 300 kg warhead) BrahMos missile. It is also deploying the short-range Dhanush ballistic missile, which is armed with either a 500 kg armor piercing warhead that can be used against ships or a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon, onboard its submarines and patrol craft.19 China has built the famed DF-21D, the world’s first ballistic anti-ship missile, which has a staggering 1,500 km range and is considered a serious threat to U.S. carriers.20 China has also acquired hundreds of regular anti-ship cruise missiles, including the Russian SS-N-27N Sizzler which an American admiral has said the U.S. Navy has no known defense against, as well as several satellites to guide long range missiles and air operations.21

Almost all Asian countries have found themselves forced to respond to this arms race. The three making the most significant fleets, other than India and China, are South Korea, Japan, and Russia. South Korea is planning to build 128 ships by 2030, although some of those are just replacing outdated vessels.22 Despite its constitutional ban on war, Japan has the strongest navy in the Pacific region, and it is investing heavily in new fighters, expensive anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), networking technology, and additional “helicopter destroyers” (a euphemism for aircraft carriers). In 2010, Japan announced that it would build its first foreign base since WWII, a navy base in Djbouti, on the Indian Ocean.23 Russia    China, Vietnam, and the Philippines is in the process of modernizing its navy to include two new amphibious assault ships, a new class of ballistic missile submarines (the largest ever built), and over 20 stealthy anti- aircraft frigates and corvettes. The Russian Navy’s latest strategic guidance document makes it clear that the focus of this buildup is the Pacific region, and most of the new ships will be deployed to the Pacific.24

The arms buildup is affecting all countries both in the heart of the region and far away from it; a few examples of this are listed below. The Royal Australian Navy, in the words of Australian Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, plans to “[Evolve] into a much more capable amphibious force, [bring] new air- warfare destroyers into the fleet, and [double] the size of the current submarine force,” in addition to plans to acquire the advanced and stealthy F-35 fighter and to potentially buy American Virginia-class nuclear submarines.25 Pakistan, understandably unnerved by the naval buildup conducted by its longtime enemy India, is investing in new basing infrastructure, more ships, and space and cyber weapons.26 Indonesia is rapidly increasing its military spending and is adding several new vessels to its fleet, including Chinese-built missile boats and ultramodern German diesel-electric submarines.27 Vietnam has begun stockpiling Russian anti- shipping missiles and Canadian maritime patrol aircraft, in addition to buying six very quiet submarines, two frigates, and a large troop transport.28 Even tiny Singapore is modernizing its fleet with the purchase of two Swedish submarines and upgrades to the rest of its submarine fleet.29

Rising tensions

 Rising Tensions

This arms buildup is made worse by the rise in tensions in the region. Most of these tensions center around the South China Sea. Half of the world’s merchant ships, carrying about $2.5 trillion worth of oil and $2.5 trillion worth in other goods, pass through the South China sea,30 meaning that any nation with control over the South China Sea controls world trade and East Asia’s supply of oil. Throw in the fact that the South China Sea is estimated to contain about 15 billion tons of oil and natural gas plus vibrant fishing and sea salt industries, and the South China Sea becomes even more of a prize.31 Naturally, this has led to several nations, namely China, Vietnam and the Philippines claiming overlapping portions of the South China Sea.32 In terms of claiming territory in the South China Sea, China is the worst offender: it claims the entire sea, as well as what it calls the “first island chain”: Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Ryukyu Islands, which are part of Japan.33 Attempts to solve the boundary dispute diplomatically in the regional ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) forum have failed,34 which has raised tension by making Chinese officials believe that force is the only way to resolve the crisis.35

These tensions have occasionally led to crises and violence. In the most recent crisis, which is still ongoing, Chinese and Filipino warships have been in a standoff for over a month because the Philippines detained Chinese fishermen it claimed were fishing in its territorial waters. China is warning its citizens of a potential war, and has deployed five warships to the location of the dispute, including an amphibious transport dock.36 Previous disputes in the region of note include a 2010 incident in which a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship and a 2009 incident where Chinese gunboats stalked an unarmed American surveillance vessel in the South China Sea and nearly collided with it. Notable violent clashes include a 2005 incident in which two Chinese warships fired on Vietnamese fishing boats China claimed entered their territorial waters, killing nine,37 and the 1974 Battle for the Paracel Islands between China and South Vietnam that resulted in South Vietnam losing a corvette and 53 sailors.38

 

Both the naval arms build up and the tensions in the South China Sea are attributable to two factors: rising nationalism and desire for national prestige in some countries, and the response to this nationalism by other nations. The best example of rising nationalism is China. The state-sponsored media regularly portrays the actions of other countries in a negative light, and occasionally calls for military action against foreigners, especially the U.S. and Japan. It tends to glorify China, and makes regular calls for reclaiming China’s “heritage” – hegemony in East Asia – from the West. Postings by Chinese civilians on social media, where nationalistic posts vastly outnumber dissident posts, even on social media not controlled by the government, show that the public buys into this sentiment.39 Japan is also experiencing a wave of nationalism,40 as very right wing candidates are gaining in power. Finally, Indian nationalism, particularly Hindu nationalism, is rising in the form of more Hindu terrorism and Mahanian calls for putting the “Indian” back in the Indian Ocean issued by members of Parliament and bureaucrats.41 Nationalism has led to a desire to assert the power of one’s country on the world stage, which partly explains the rise of aggressive, internationalist foreign policies in China and India. Most Asian nations have become alarmed by these aggressive policies and started arming, which has created the current situation.

Analysis

The United States needs to approach this situation with extreme caution. If the U.S. increased cooperation between its navy and one of its allies’ navies, or increased arms sales to an ally, it would just fuel more arms buildup from countries wary of U.S. influence tilting the balance of power in the region against them. It is thus in America’s best interest to act as a neutral arbiter in the region, deploying to any crisis zone to convince both parties to back down. Being a neutral arbiter of disputes would necessitate both strong offensive and defensive capabilities: offensive capabilities to crush the aggressors if a battle breaks out, and defensive capabilities to shield merchant vessels and allied warships from attack.

This also means that the U.S. will need to change the structure of the force it has in East Asia. Retaliation solely against enemy naval assets makes the most sense since it can quickly end a conflict without escalating it, so weapons that are primarily land-attack, namely Marines, amphibious warfare ships, and strategic bombers, should be moved out of harms way. This is why the Marine Corp’s new base in Darwin, Australia is so crucial: it is out of a potential combat zone, so troops and ships are completely safe there, yet it is close enough to the South China Sea, the heart of East Asia and the most likely location of a future conflict, that ships based there can deploy to a crisis zone quickly. If this base was expanded to include amphibious warfare ships, it could realize its full potential as a new, safe staging area for the United States in the Western Pacific.

The best policy is to not provoke war. The U.S. should pay attention to its actions in the region and be sure that they could not be seen as aggressive. However, these tensions demand a constant, strong show of force by the U.S. to prevent any armed conflicts from breaking out. However, the U.S. Navy alone has the power to police the waters of the South China Sea, cause tensions to cool down before they boil over and become wars, and protect our allies and defeat aggressors in the event of a conflict, so doing anything other than increasing American military presence in Asia is not an option.

Citations

1. “Military Spending 2011 Regional Infographic, Top 10 Military Spenders & More.” Army Technology. 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 17 May 2012.

2. ibid 1

3. “Global Fund for Women.” Militarism Facts. Global Fund for Women, 2010. Web. 17 May 2012.

4. ibid 1

5. Keating, Joshua E. “Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy. Dec. 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

6. Scott, David. “India’s Drive for a ‘Blue Water’ Navy.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10.2 (2008): n. pag. Print.

7. Thomas, Rich. “China Plans World’s Second-Largest Carrier Fleet.” Yahoo! News. Yahoo!, 25 July 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

8. “India Looking for Amphibious Ships.” Defense Industry Daily. 27 Nov. 2011. Web. 17 May 2012.

9. Lague, David. “Analysis: New China Landing Vessels Point to Pacific Rivalry.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 14 Feb. 2012. Web. 17 May 2012.

10. ibid 6

11. United States. Congressional Research Service. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress. By Ronald O’Rourke. 2012. Google Docs. Web. 18 May 2012.

12. ibid 11

13. ibid 6

14. AESA Radar: Revolutionary Capabilities for Multiple Missions. N.p.: Lockheed Martin, n.d. Print.

15. “Type 052 (Luhu Class) Missile Destroyer - SinoDefence.com.” Sino Defense. 1 Mar. 2009. Web. 17 May 2012.

16. India. Indian Navy. Ships in Service of the Indian

Navy. 2012. Web.

17. ibid 6

18. ibid 11

19. ibid 6

20. ibid 11

21. ibid 11

22. ibid 5

23. Werthiem, Eric. “World Navies in Review.” Proceedings Mar. 2012: 36-41. Print.

24. Fedyszyn, Thomas. “Renaissance of the Russian Navy?.” Proceedings Mar. 2012: 30-35. Print.

25. Griggs, Ray. “The Commanders Respond.” Proceed- ings Mar. 2012: 16-17. Print.

26. ibid 23

27. ibid 22

28. ibid 22

29. ibid 22

30. United States. Center for Naval Analysis. Institute for

National Strategic Studies. South China Sea Oil Shipping Lanes. Print.

31. “Rich Resources in the South China Sea.” China Oceanic Information Network. People’s Republic of China. Web. 18 May 2012.

32. Bayron, Heda. “ASEAN Meeting to Examine South China Sea Dispute.” Voice of America. U.S.A., 11 July 2011. Web. 18 May 2012.

33. Sato, Koichi. China’s territorial Claims at Sea: The East China and South China Sea. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Google docs. Web. 25 May 2012.

34. Weissmann, Mikael. “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-Asean Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.” Asian Perspective 34.3 (2010): 25-69. Print.

35. Thearith, Leng. Is ASEAN Still Relevant? Phnom Penh: n.p., 2009. Print.

36. McElroy, Damien. “Chinese Media Warns of War with Philipppines.” The Telegraph. 10 May 2012. Web. 18 May 2012.

37. “Vietnam Protests Chinese Firing at Fishing Boats.” Intellasia East Asia News. 15 Jan. 2005. Web. 18 May 2012.

38. Ha, Van Ngnac. “Battle For Paracel Islands.” Battle For Paracel Islands. VNAF MA, 2005. Web. 18 May 2012

39. Grammaticas, Damian. “China’s Rising Nationalism Troubles West.” BBC News. BBC, 17 Nov. 2009. Web. 18 May 2012.

40. Kumagai, Hiroshi. “H. Kumagai: Rising Nationalism in Northeast Asia.” Universal Peace Federation. 17 Sept. 2009. Web. 18 May 2012.

41. Kaplan, Robert D. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.

Corruption in China as a force-multiplier

Reports are coming out of intense corruption in the Chinese military. These come as no surprise, since China is a highly corrupt society to begin with thanks to the unusually close relationship between government and business that characterizes Chinese state-capitalism and China's ancient tradition of wealthy nobility being awarded government positions that dates back to the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE. Corruption in the military hampers the effectiveness of communication and lowers discipline, while corruption in the civilian government keeps millions in poverty and creating a major wealth disparity between the rich Eastern cities and the poorer yet more populous West.

On its face, this looks pretty good for the U.S. America is in the business of maintaining its hegemony, which it can do by keeping its challengers down. Corruption hurts China by hurting the Chinese economy, weakening their military, and increasing the possibility of a revolution by the poor West.

However, the U.S. has both a moral and realist responsibility to denounce corruption in China. Morally, the U.S. must denounce corruption because it unfairly hurts China's poor and kills millions, which no upright human being can allow. This in turn would increase America's soft power and moral standing in the world by showing other nations that the U.S. cares about helping the little guy. From a realist point of view, however, denouncing corruption by sending Hilary Clinton to China to give a speech saying something along the lines of "rampant corruption like China's makes a government illegitimate" would help speed along a collapse of the Communist Party. How would this work? First, it is highly improbable that any speech by a U.S. official, even by the President, would force China to change its corrupt ways. Corruption in China is too deeply entrenched and too ancient of a tradition to be ended by a speech. Further, despite the amazing volume of organizations, money, and laws (1,200 of the latter) that have been used to attempt to fight corruption in China, corruption has increased, not decreased.

While denouncing Chinese corruption is unlikely to deny the U.S. the benefits of this corruption, it will likely incite anger against the regime. Corruption in China is well-known, but most Chinese I have talked to merely regard it as a fact of life and not as an evil. It would not be particularly hard to show a large swath of the Chinese people who corruption hurts them because this is plainly evident in most parts of the country. If a speech by Hilary Clinton or another prominent, well-known American were to call corruption evil, it could incite some small-scale revolts against the Chinese leadership, which would in turn weaken China. Even if that does not happen, the end result is still good: China remains hobbled by corruption while the U.S. gets a new image as a moral crusader for justice.

U.S.-China War

 Everyone these days talks about a potential war between the US and China. Thus, it would be beneficial to find out what such a war would actually look like.

To understand what a China-US war would play out, we must understand why such a war would be fought and what actions either side would take. The most commonly predicted scenario is a Chinese attack on Taiwan, which would involve a massive first strike using missiles aimed at defeating US forces in the reason. The scenario that the Chinese consider to be “most probable” would involve a US attack on the mainland, presumably to hold on to their status as the world’s sole superpower for a bit longer.(1)

In the first scenario, the Chinese would presumably launch a massive surprise attack on US bases in the region using ballistic missiles with submunitions, attack US naval forces with submarines and missiles, and launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

The amount of missiles and aircraft the Chinese can throw at the local US bases would mean that these bases would be disabled even if air defense systems operate as planned.(3) However, the short scramble time of US jets (around 8 minutes)(4) means that most jets would be able to immediately retaliate. The US has around 500 fighters (5) in the region, while China has about 1000 (2), however the superiority of US aircraft and pilots means that the USAF will wipe out most of the Chinese force in the initial combat.(6) However, since the American planes will lack airbases to return to, and since American tankers are highly vulnerable, most US fighters will crash. Thus US air superiority will depend on aircraft carriers, although their opponent, the PLAAF, will be greatly weakened.

The Chinese will also make a point to attack American satellites on the first night of the war (7). Since the US army and Air Force rely heavily on satellite intelligence, they will not be able to operate as effectively as they have in the past. However, US forces will not be completely crippled without satellites, as their functions can be largely replaced by UAVs, shipborne communications, and portable ground radars. (8) The US also possesses advanced anti-satellite technology, which can also be expected to be used extensively. Thus both sides would be denied satellite use, which would again hurt the US more, although NASA and private space launch firms could quickly replace some satellites.(9)

China also possesses nuclear warheads and ICBMs capable of striking the US, although they only have 240 warheads and even fewer ICBMs. Nevertheless, both China (10) and the US (11) abide by MAD theory and have made it clear that they will not use nuclear weapons. However, if nuclear weapons were to be launched, the inferiority of China’s weapons (they are liquid fueled, making them easier to shoot down and less accurate), their slow response times (Chinese missiles are unfueled in their silos, meaning that their missiles would take three hours to launch, although poor detection systems would make the response time even greater. US missiles, by contrast, can launch in under two minutes, and benefit from an advanced detection system), and the huge size of the American arsenal (5,113 warheads) means that China would be obliterated, at comparatively little cost to the United States. Current US nuclear primacy also means that if a war became unwinnable, nuclear weapons would be on the table. (12)

The biggest variable in the war would be cyber warfare. Both sides posses some kind of cyber warfare capability, although only the US possesses industry disrupting technology like Stuxnet. However, the US is also the most vulnerable to a cyber attack, since their forces rely heavily on network-centric operations and UAVs (which can be hacked). In the event of a major war, the Chinese would have the capability to disable most of the US power grid, injure the economy, and somewhat decrease (though not cripple) the US army’s ability to fight. Whether or not they would be willing to do so remains unclear, but all signs point to yes, since there is no military reason why they would not, and politics would be much less of an issue in a war. The US could easily retaliate, however, and since their cyber warfare capabilities are more advanced. An American counter attack would probably result in a crippling of Chinese communications (which are not secured), network-centric warfare operations, power grid, and probably economy. Thus, the US would benefit most militarily from a cyber war (since network-centric fighting is not vital to the US war effort, and since a loss of communication would be far more devastating to the Chinese than a loss of network-centered warfare capabilities would be to the US), although China would benefit most overall (since the destruction of the US power grid and crippling of the economy would reduce support for the war and make the country unwilling to fight).(13)
However, most of the war will be fought at sea. (14) The Chinese would most likely manufacture crises in the Middle East through Iran (and its terrorist network) to tie down US carriers. It would then deal with the much smaller US force in the region using ballistic missiles (specifically the DF-21D), ship and submarine based anti-ship missiles (AShM), submarines, and naval mines. (15)

The primary concern for US fleets is said to be the DF-21D long range ballistic anti-shipping missile. However, all US fleets include at least one ship equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense, which has been proven to be effective against missiles that fly much faster than the DF-21D. Most scholars agree that Aegis will be effective against threats such as the DF-21D, so China’s ballistic missiles should pose little threat to US naval forces.(16)
China also possesses regular AShMs, which can be fired from aircraft, surface ships, submarines, or land based batteries. The USN has two means of air and missile defense: fighters on patrol and the Aegis Air Defense System. Since the fighters will be involved with air superiority duties, the task of air and missile defense will fall to Aegis. Aegis is a complex system centered around the AN/SPY-1 radar, considered to be the most powerful shipborne radar in the world. The system integrates long range SM-2 anti-aircraft missiles, Enhanced Sea Sparrow missiles and RIM-116 RAM missiles for close in defense, and Phalanx automated autocannon turrets for extreme close in defense. The system has proved effective in most (80%) (17) test engagements against missiles that simulate both cruise and ballistic missiles.(18) Although there are concerns that the Chinese may be able to overwhelm the system with an unending wave of attacks, Aegis is capable of engaging up to one hundred targets at once, although a new AESA-type radar (AN/SPY-3) will increase that number. (19)

However, China has one missile capable of defeating the Aegis system: the Russian 3M-54E Klub cruise missile. It flies stealthily along the surface of the water, and then launches into a supersonic sprint moments before impact, giving the target ship almost no reaction time. The US navy has stated that they lack a means of defeating this missile (20), although the Chinese only have 50 in their inventory (21), meaning that the US can just attack the ships carrying said missiles.

The Chinese also posses extensive amounts of naval mines. However, the US navy possesses extensive anti-mine technology, which it used to great effect in the Gulf War. Further, the few mines that did strike US ships did little damage, and most ships were able to continue operations while sustaining mine damage. (22) Current US mine countermeasures technologies and experience with using these technologies (23) means that mines will at best be a nuisance that could force the US to expend valuable ships mine hunting instead of carrying out combat operations.

The biggest threat to US naval supremacy is submarines, specifically diesel-electric submarines. Modern diesel-electrics are almost completely silent, can swim in shallower waters than their nuclear counterparts, and are far cheaper. The US navy has consistently lost to both modern (such as the Dutch Walrus class) and outdated (such as Australia’s Collins class) subs in exercises. The US Navy also lacks any effective means to train to detect diesel-electric submarines.(24) China has 52 diesel-electric boats, and has both copies of the advanced American Mk. 48 torpedo and the Soviet supersonic Shkval torpedo, both of which can easily sink a carrier.(25)

Finally, although land forces will probably not be a factor in a US-China war, they are worth noting. The USMC is the world’s finest Marine force, in terms of quality of leadership, soldier quality, and technology. Thus the Marines would probably be able to land in either China or Taiwan easily. (26) Although the Marines are presumed to be superior to the PLA, they would be outnumbered so dramatically that any Marine assault would be quick to fail. Attempts to land Army transports would require total sea superiority, which could not be guaranteed due to Chinese submarines. Thus an American land assault would most likely end in complete and total destruction.

So, with these factors in mind, we can imagine a US-China war in which China strikes first would look something like this:
Chinese forces strike first en masse, destroying US airbases, satellites and sinking several ships. The PLAAF is defeated within several days or weeks by naval aviation, local fighter squadrons, and fighters from around the world. US air supremacy allows for two things: ensuring protection of US fleets from AShMs, and pummeling the Chinese forces in Taiwan. China also initiates a cyber attack that destroys most of the US economy and power grid, although the attacks are repulsed quickly. Retaliatory American attacks on Chinese industry, coupled with conventional attacks on Chinese shipping and bombing of industrial centers eliminates public support for the war. After several months, the American public become war-weary after seeing the extreme casualties inflicted upon them by the Chinese. The Chinese government, seeing the damage done to its navy and its economy, decides to pursue peace. The talks come before a US amphibious invasion of the mainland, and although the option is kept on the table, it is a bluff by the US, since such an invasion would most likely be a failure. A treaty is signed, but only after extreme losses in both blood and treasure to both sides.

The other side: US declares war on China
The US government lacks (to my knowledge and the knowledge of the Internet) a plan to actually invade China, since doing so would be economic and political suicide. However, if such an attack were to occur, it would most likely be intended to overthrow the Communist party.
With that as the main objective, indiscriminate killing of civilians would not be an option. Instead, cyber warfare and traditional psychological warfare (PsyOps) would open up the Internet, radio and news to Chinese civilians while spreading propaganda. Meanwhile, airstrikes and cruise missile attacks on radar installations, air defense centers, and government structures. The hope would be for the Chinese public to revolt against their government to spare the US the need to mount an amphibious invasion.

This strategy would probably backfire, for several reasons. First, the Chinese military is designed with one purpose: prevent an invasion. The Chinese navy consists mostly of small missile boats designed to operate only in the littorals (coastal regions). So while these boats would have little effect on a US force defending Japan or Taiwan, they could be a major nuisance to an invasion force. They have an impressive amount of short range ballistic missiles that would easily rout any force that attempts to attack targets there. China also lacks any targets that if destroyed would cripple their air defense system.There is a possibility that such targets exist, but they are classified, however evidence seems to show that China’s radar installations are too widely dispersed to be taken out by a single blow. (27) Further, China has an advanced air defense system that would frustrate any prolonged air campaign in the country.(28)
Second, the Chinese populace seems unwilling to rise up against their government. Support for America is already very high, so PsyOps would have little effect. The Chinese government has reliably crushed democracy demonstrations in times of war or peace, which would deter any possible revolution.

So while a Chinese attack would eventually fail, albeit at high cost to both participants, a US attack would also fail, although for much different reasons.

Citations
1 If it comes to a shooting war..., Victor Corpus, Asia Times Online, 20 April, 2006 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD20Ad03.html
2 Air Combat Past, Present and Future, John Stillion and Scott Perdue, RAND Project Air Force publication, August 2008.
3 Norad on Heightened Alert: Role of air defence agency rapidly transformed in wake of Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Linda Slobodian, published in The Calgary Herald, 13 October 2008
4 http://www.af.mil/publicwebsites/sitecmd.asp?id=8 USAF forces in the Pacific
5 Adam Baddeley (February 2011). "The AMR Regional Air Force Directory 2011". Asian Military Review.
6 IBID #2.
7 IBID #1
8 Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, Norman Freidman, September 1991, Naval Institute Press.
9 Anti-satellite (ASAT) Capabilities of US Missile Defense Systems, David Wright and Laura Grego, Disarmament Diplomacy December 9, 2002.
10 China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence Sr. COL Yao Yunzhu, PLA. Air & Space Power Journal, 1 March 2010. http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/spr10/yao.html
11 Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited, COL Alan Parington, USAF, Airpower Journal, Winter 1997 http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/AIRCHRONICLES/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html. and Obama Endorses Mutual Assured Destruction, Ron Pistaro, 11 July, 2009.
12 The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61508/keir-a-lieber-and-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy
13 HOW CHINA WILL USE CYBER WARFARE TO LEAPFROG IN MILITARY COMPETITIVENESS, Jason Fritz, Culture Mandala, V ol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
14 How We Would Fight China, Robert D. Kaplan, Atlantic Magazine, June 2005. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/06/how-we-would-fight-china/3959/2/
15 IBID #1
16 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke (Specialists in Naval Affairs), CRS report for Congress, 8 April, 2010.
17 Air Defense: Teaching Old Aegis New Tricks, Strategy Page.com, 20 March, 2010. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/20090320.aspx
18 Aegis Cruiser Intercepts Two Simultaneous Targets on Missile Test, Defense Update, 27 April, 2007. http://defense-update.com/newscast/0407/news/270407_aegis_bmd.htm
19 Fact File: Aegis System, US Navy, 2 November 2011 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=200&ct=2
20 Navy Lacks Plan to Defend Against ‘Sizzler’ Missile, Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg, 23 March 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5LkaU0wj714&refer=home
21 China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions, Suijin Guo, Ashgate Publishing ltd., 2006
22 IBID #8
23 21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare, Maj. GEN Thomas Benes, USMC, Anne Sandel, June 2009.
24 Diesel-Electric Submarines, the U.S. Navy’s Latest Annoyance, Grace Jean, National Defense, April 2008, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/April/Pages/AntiSub2301.aspx
25 The PLAN Submarine Force, Sid Trevethan, May 2004.
26 Marines.com
27 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, DOD, FY04 (presumably 2004).
28 China’s Air Defense Missile Systems, Carlo Kopp, Defense Focus.

China really is a threat

Recently, I read an interesting article in the New York Times titled “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan.” The premise of the article was that the US should stop protecting Taiwan in exchange for cancellation of debts owed to China. The author raises an interesting point in the article: our main interests abroad are economic.

“He should make it clear that today American jobs and wealth matter more than military prowess,” Paul Kane, the author of the article and a former Harvard professor and Marine, wrote.
So I must ask: is he right? Should the US “go soft?” Here it is useful to look at the current policies of the government before analyzing it theoretically.

In their annual budget report, published in November 2011, the US Department of State wrote that the mission of the United States abroad was to, “Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere."[1]

So we can see that the United States currently does not act in an economically self-interested way, it currently aims to help those around the globe. The question is: should it?

Those who support Kane will argue that under Locke’s theory of the social contract, which formed the basis for our society, governments primarily have an obligation to their people.2 However, it is interesting to note that governments must conform to the will of the people, not just to their interests, because we must first consult with the populace to know what their interests are. So it would be a misconstruction of Locke to say that we must place economic goals first.

In addition, this was adopted as our political philosophy back in the day when our government was too weak to be concerned about anything other than our own survival. Today, as the world’s most powerful nation, we are in a greatly different position. We have the ability to uphold goods such as democracy, liberty and free trade around the globe. Regular people have an obligation to be just, so the same principles should apply to governments.

In the case of China, we clearly have values and interests, including economic interests, that do not overlap with those of China. China is an authoritarian state that has been attempting to spread its influence around the region. The spread of China’s anti-human rights, anti-freedom model of government would not be desirable for our interests. Another policy of China’s that we should aim to stop is the attempt by China to assert its dominance over the South China Sea [3], through which 50% of world trade flows. [4] Almost all of our oil also flows through this region, and re-routing it would send the price of oil up drastically. [4] Even disregarding the fact that freedom of trade and navigation our two of our biggest goals internationally, giving a foreign country that does not share our values and believes that the U.S. is evil and ought to lose its hegemony control of our oil lifelines would not be desirable.

Economic interdependence is rarely a deterrent of war, as best illustrated by Britain and Germany in 1914 [5] (the two countries were each other’s largest trading partners on the eve of the war, but differences in values and desires to dominate the Earth led to war). For most people, defense of national values tend to surpass prosperity as their greatest interest. This is seen in many wars throughout history where civilians voluntarily put themselves through hardship to continue fighting.

Cites
1 http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#mission United States Department of State Mission Statement
2 The Social Contract in America: From the Revolution to the Present Age, Mark Hulliung. September 2007, American Political Thought. ISBN: 978-0-7006-1540-7
3 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/s-china-sea-control-others-question-beijing-wary-india-tests-the-waters/877491/ S China Sea control: Others question Beijing, wary India tests the waters – Indian Express
4 http://www.siis.org.cn/en/zhuanti_view_en.aspx?id=10116
5 http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/papa.htm Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I, International Security, Vol. 20, no. 4, Spring 1996