How to stop Russia's rise with natural gas

On New Year’s Day, 2009, a dispute over payment between Russia and Ukraine led to Russia cutting off all Ukraine bound gas, which included 25 percent of the European Union’s gas supply.1 To make things worse, Europe was in the middle of an especially harsh winter. Even though most countries had prepared for a gas shortage by stockpiling natural gas, their efforts were not enough, as few European countries had more than a month’s worth of reserves, and many lacked any reserves. The crisis hit Europe hard: Bulgaria was forced to shut off industrial production to save fuel for heating, thousands lost heating and electricity, and tiny Slovakia even declared a national state of emergency.1

This is not an isolated event. Russia has halted Europe’s gas supply in 1999, 2006, 2009, and 2012, each time in the dead of winter. The 2009 shortage cost €1 billion in Ireland alone2, and the 2012 shortage caused 650 deaths in Central and Eastern Europe.3 Although the EU as a whole gets only 31 percent of its gas from Russia, many Eastern European countries get 90-100 percent of their gas through Ukraine, and Germany, the EU’s de facto leader, gets 42 percent.4 Besides denying thousands of people heat for the homes and offices and severely injuring economies, these gas crises have broader geopolitical implications. Ukraine gave half the ownership of its gas pipeline, its biggest source of revenue, over to Gazprom (the Russian state-owned energy agency) after the 2009 crisis. Further, Russia took over most Ukrainian mines and power stations, has sent in many Gazprom security police to guard the pipeline (actually heavily armed soldiers and drones), boosted cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian defense ministries, has secured not only a more favorable Ukrainian government but also a much longer lease on its critical Black Sea base in Sevastopol, and, most ominously, has begun implementing political reforms in Ukraine to make Ukraine more like Russia. Russia has also exploited the total reliance of Eastern Europe on Gazprom’s natural gas in mid-2009 when it set up a number of security and economic alliances that heavily favored Russia (think Warsaw Pact part II).5 When Turkey lost 67 percent of its gas in 2009, it cozied up to Iran to get gas from them. Turkey helped Iran build a major pipeline through Turkey, a pipeline that until very recently continued to operate despite sanctions on Iran.

Further, Russia is not nearly as dependent on the EU as the EU is on Russia. Russia is building new pipelines to China and the Koreas, and has recently completed pipelines to China in 2010, and to Turkey and the Caucus region in 2006.6, 7, 8 Demand from Turkey and China nearly equals demand from Europe,8 meaning that Russia can make up lost gas revenues from Europe by simply increasing gas supply to other countries.

Europe’s reliance on Russian gas stems largely from the fact that Europe has little gas of its own. However, it seems puzzling that European nations continue to rely on authoritarian and unpredictable Russia in light of recent events in the gas market. 2011 was a record year for U.S. natural gas production, which now outstrips domestic demand by 119 billion cubic meters.9 This is excess is far greater than European demand, which currently amounts to 65 billion cubic meters.1 American shale gas is cheap, too: it is at the lowest price in a decade. This boom and low price is largely attributable to recent advances in shale-gas mining techniques that have opened up billions of cubic meters of gas up to drilling.10 Exporting this excess gas to Eastern Europe would be beneficial for gas companies and U.S. foreign relations: gas companies would make greater profits while the U.S. would keep Eastern Europe out of Russia’s sphere of influence. Further, Europeans citizens would benefit from U.S. gas: American natural gas costs $30 per 1,000 cubic meters11, while Russian gas shipped to Western Europe costs $500 per 1,000 cubic meters and gas shipped through Ukraine costs $250 per 1,000 cubic meters.12 If natural gas prices were lowered this dramatically, Europe’s economic recovery would speed up rapidly.

So what is it that stops the U.S. from exporting more gas to Europe? As usual, the answer is money. Natural gas must undergo an expensive liquefaction process before sea transport, while it can be left in its natural gaseous state for pipeline transport. Further, after a sea journey, natural gas must be regassified, a process that can only be done at expensive terminals that usually cost more than $1 billion13 to build.

In the long run, it is worthwhile to make investments in building regasification terminals in Eastern Europe because the expected monetary payoff to gas companies and political payoff to the U.S. government is so great. In the short term, however, stop gap measures must be taken. The U.S. can assist European nations in acquiring machines called floating regasification and storage units (FSRUs), natural gas tankers converted to serve as regasification terminals. FSRUs can be leased for an average of $70 million per year, an inexpensive price considering that one FSRU can regassify 3.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas, or 125 percent of Lithuania’s natural gas consumption. FSRUs are also much quicker to build than regasification terminals. Already, Lithuania, one of the first European countries to lease an FSRU, has seen its negotiating power with the Russian leadership increase after it leased its FSRU earlier this year.14

To do its part, Europe can start developing its own shale gas reserves and diversifying its gas sources. The EU sits on 2.168 trillion cubic meters14 of accessible natural gas. If the EU were to build facilities for extracting this gas, it could hypothetically eliminate the need for foreign supplies of gas. Further, the EU could turn to other sources of gas, such as Qatar or Mozambique, both of which have made enormous natural gas discoveries recently.15

The process of weaning Europe off of Russia’s teat may be dirty and expensive. But the end result, a steep drop in Russian influence in Europe, particularly Eastern Europe, will be enormously valuable from a geopolitical standpoint. Once Russian influence is no more in Europe, true integration of Eastern Europe into the EU and the Schengen Area can begin, which will further bolster the EU and make it an effective counterweight to Russia. This would be particularly beneficial for the U.S., which has a prime opportunity to accelerate the recovery by bolstering the natural gas industry and to weaken its old foe. America would be a fool not to take it.

 
Citations 
1.. "FACTBOX - 18 countries affected by Russia-Ukraine gas row." Reuters 7 Jan. 2009:
    n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
"Natural gas shortages slam many European nations." Tuscon Citizen 7 Jan. 2009: n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
2. Leahy, Eimear & Devitt, Conor & Lyons, Seán & Tol, Richard S. J., 2011. "The Cost of Natural Gas Shortages in Ireland, "WP397, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
3. Murray, Alina. "Cold Weather Snap in Eastern Europe Kills More Than 650." MSNBC 2 Feb. 2012: n. pag. MSNBC. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
4.European Union. EU-Russian Gas Relations in Perspective: Challenges and Opportunities. N.p.: European Dialogue, 2012. European Dialogue. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
5. United States. U.S. Army. Russian Influence on Ukrainian Strategic Policy. By Defek G.
    Webb. Charleston, SC: U.S. Army, 2011. Print.
6. Stnagarone, Troy. "Russia's North Korea Gas Deal." The Diplomat 15 Nov. 2011: n. pag. New Leader Forum. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
7. British Petroleum. “Southern Caucasus Pipeline overview."
8. Reuters. "New Russian pipeline replaces oil by rail." Global Times 10 Dec. 2010: n. pag. Global Times: Discover China Discover the World. Web. 13 Apr. 2012..
9. United States. Energy Information Administration. Natural Gas Overview. N.p.: Energy Information Administration, 2012. Department of Energy. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
10. Osborne, Andrew. "Why natural gas is cheap and gasoline isn’t." New York Times 30 Mar. 2012: n. pag. NYT. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
11.United States. Energy Information Administration. Quantity and Average Price of Natural Gas Production in the United States, 1930-2000. N.p.: Energy Information Administration, 2000. Department of Energy. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
12. Osborne, Andrew. "Russia Firm Cuts Gas to Ukraine, But EU Hit Is Cushioned ." Wall Street Journal 2 Jan. 2009: n. pag. WSJ. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .
13. "Lithuania leveraging a new LNG technology." STRATFOR 8 Mar. 2012: n. pag. Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
14. "European Union." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 3 Apr. 2012.
15.LeVine, Steve. " For Alaska (and Qatar and Mozambique and Russia) China is the hub of hope." Foreign Policy 12 Apr. 2012: n. pag. Foreign Policy. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. .

How to contain Brazil

    As American presidential candidates and pundits alike yammer about the threat posed by a rising China, the rise of another potentially unfriendly superpower closer to home has been ignored. This nation is Brazil, the seventh richest country in the world1, ahead of Britain, and the third highest GDP growth rate2 from 2000 to 2010. Although Brazil is not nearly strong enough to challenge American hegemony, it is powerful enough to frustrate U.S. policies and actions in ways that harm U.S. interests. Therefore, the United States should not only take actions to convince Brazil to support the U.S., but it should also work to break up Brazil’s power.

Brazil’s rising power status is questioned by nobody. Brazil’s rise is a true success story; a fight against both an unforgiving geography and relentless inflation3 that kept the country in endless poverty despite high growth. Brazil’s rainforest geography, lack of easily accessible arable land (most arable land is deep in the interior rainforest) have provided significant obstacles to growth. The natural barrier provided by the Amazon ensures that all trade and thus all major cities are confined to the Atlantic Ocean, which further frustrates growth because the Great Escapade, a high wall of mountains, runs along the coast except for in a few small pockets, confining Brazil’s cities to these small pockets and thereby preventing transportation links between Brazilian cities and the development of economies of scale.3 Brazil shot up to prominence once the forests were cleared and roads built, creating farmland and  enabling the rise of a middle class of small farmers.3 Further, the implementation of the Real Plan (named for the Real, the new Brazilian currency created by the plan) in 1994 brought inflation down from 45 percent in 1994 to one percent in 1996 by tightening monetary policy, floating the currency, and tying the Real to the dollar.5 While this destruction of inflation hampered growth by tightening credit and cutting deficit spending, the Real Plan vastly increased the purchasing power of most Brazilians, decreasing the poverty rate by 10 percent in two years5 and creating a consumer economy in Brazil from scratch. It is the largest country in South America, both in terms of population and wealth. Despite having growth decreased by the Real Plan, Brazil’s growth rate remains high, as mentioned before. Further, this growth appears to be here to stay: Brazil’s economy is largely based on agriculture, and its products, particularly soybeans (needed for tofu, food additives and animal feed) and sugar cane (used as biofuel and food sweetener) are in high demand and will likely remain so in the future.6 The Brazilian people’s high purchasing power, and the fact that the Brazilian poverty rate is plummeting, ensures the long-term health of the domestic consumption economy as a main driver of growth. Brazil has also discovered enormous oil fields: Brazil sits on 50 billion barrels of oil, enough to propel it into the top five oil producers by 2020,7 and some estimate that 70-100 billion barrels more are located offshore.8 Although Brazil slumped in 2011, this slump was largely the result of faltering consumer spending, a problem that can be easily overcome. Likewise, Brazil's inflation crisis, which is largely the result of excessive foreign investment from China, can be solved through tighter currency regulations. 14, 3

This wealth has translated to regional dominance. The Brazilian state-owned firm Petrobras controls the Bolivian natural-gas industry, the largest sector in the Bolivian economy, and almost all Bolivian agricultural products are shipped to Brazil. Large numbers of Brazilians have migrated to Paraguay, and Brazil is the largest investor in the Paraguayan economy, particularly in its energy sector. Brazilian cash drives Uruguay’s financial industry, the main driver of Uruguay’s economy, and Brazilians now own a majority of Uruguay’s farmland.3 All told, Brazil is the largest direct investor in Latin American nations and the most powerful country in the region, giving it the status of regional hegemon.

In the past, Brazil’s power has been checked by that of its neighbors, particularly Argentina. Argentina benefits from many large navigable rivers (which facilitate trade) and the fact that most of its territory is large arable plains, which facilitate not only large-scale agriculture but economies of scale and giant cities. Historically, these geographic advantages have played out in the way one would expect: Argentina wore the pants in the Argentina-Brazil relationship. Argentina dominated the Southern Cone region (Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Southern Brazil) that formed the heartland of South America after Argentina’s victory against Brazil in the 1825 Cisplatine War. By dominating this crucial, resource rich region, Argentina rose to global prominence and was even able to challenge European powers, seen most recently in the Falklands War. Although modern Argentina is but a shadow of its former self, it remains the second most powerful country in South America and the only potential threat to Brazil.

Recognizing the threat posed by Argentina, Brazil has undertaken a number of successful measures to ally itself with Argentina. The two countries consider each other to be in a “strategic alliance,” and their militaries collaborate extensively.9 Brazil and Argentina have collaborated on designing military aircraft, and their militaries frequently drill together. Most importantly, the two countries have shared details on their top-secret uranium enrichment plants with each other. Further, Brazil supports Argentina in Argentina’s claim over the Falklands Islands, Argentina’s biggest foreign policy issue.10 However, the main way in which Brazil has formed a cohesive power block in South America is economically, through the Mercosur trade agreement that involves Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay i.e. Brazil and the Southern Cone nations. Mercosur is a free-trade organization with a standardized external trade policy, similar to NAFTA or ASEAN. Mercosur has led to great amounts of trade and migration between Brazil and Argentina, deepening their ties. Mercosur is also the main means by which Brazil controls the Southern Cone: while individual deals brought local nations into Brazilian suzerainty, Brazil sets the common foreign policies of the region through Mercosur.10

With its one major enemy removed, and its status as regional hegemon fully secured, Brazil stepped on to the world stage. Brazil leads the UN mission in Haiti, has tripled its foreign aid budget since 200811 and has participated in 27 UN peacekeeping missions. However, Brazil’s stint in the international arena has been anything but beneficial to the U.S. Historically, Brazil has been unfriendly to the U.S.; Brazil worked with the Chinese and the Soviets during the Cold War and refused to oppose Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Brazil refuses to cooperate with American demands, seen in Brazil’s unwillingness to pacify its neighbors or crack down on drug lords in neighboring countries.12 Another major source of friction between the two nations is an incident in which Brazil negotiated with Iran in 2010, despite explicit U.S. instructions not to interact with Iran. Economically, Brazil has been working to exclude the U.S. from South America through economic integration unions such as Mercosur and was the main opponent of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in addition to raising tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods. Further, Brazil has worked to actively oppose U.S. actions. Brazil has opposed American anti-drug lord operations in Colombia and has even insisted that any American military actions in South America be approved by Brazil first. Brazil has also opposed most recent U.S. foreign policy, particularly the War on Terror, the invasion of Libya and the U.S. attempt to pass a UN Security Council resolution condemning Syria. Overall, Brazil’s attitude towards the U.S. is one of suspicion: Brazil regards the U.S. as an obstacle to its rise and thus is unfriendly towards the U.S.13

The United States ought to undertake a two-pronged approach to protecting its interests from Brazil. First, the U.S. needs to reach out to Brazil in order to show the Brazilian government that American interests and values are aligned with those of Brazil. Value-wise, both countries are Western-style republics that value democracy and liberty. Brazil benefits from the security provided to it by U.S. hegemony and is made wealthy by the freedom of navigation the U.S. Navy provides. The U.S. should try to convince the Brazilian leadership, through state visits and possibly through incentives such as subsidies for sugar-cane based biofuels from Brazil, that U.S. hegemony benefits Brazil. Second, the U.S. must try to peacefully frustrate Brazilian regional hegemony. This can be done in two ways: by assisting South American nations that are opposed to Brazil and by creating an alternative to Mercosur. Already, Brazil’s rise has hit opposition from several South American countries, particularly Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia. The U.S. can reach out to Colombia by providing more assistance in attacking drug operations there and by increasing trade to Colombia, which would pull the country away from Brazil. Likewise, U.S. investment in developing Bolivian resources, particularly in the emerging and strategic lithium industry, could make the U.S. Bolivia’s main trading partner and thus bring Bolivia out of Brazil’s shadow. Although Colombia and Bolivia are the two pieces of low-hanging fruit, efforts to strengthen ties with South American nations to weaken Brazil’s grip on the region must be made with most South American countries. The centerpiece of this weakening of Brazilian hegemony should be the creation of an alternative to Mercosur. Mercosur is already faltering, as it is becoming obvious that the organization exists solely as a means to further Brazilian power and not to promote free trade.3 If the U.S. were to create a free-trade organization in South America incorporating the Mercosur countries and other South American nations, this would tie South America to the U.S. instead of Brazil, especially if this free-trade organization was more of a free-trade organization than Mercosur is. Inevitable Brazilian opposition to such an organization can be circumvented by offering membership to the other Mercosur nations first, and then letting peer pressure kick in.

Brazil’s rise cannot be halted, nor should it be. However, Brazil’s economic strength need not imply regional hegemony, a fact that can be ensured by increased U.S. involvement in South America. 

Pictured above: A Brazilian oil platform, the first to tap the massive and newly discovered "sugar loaf" deposit off of Brazil's coast. Platforms like this one will catapult Brazil into the ranks of the world's largest oil producers and ensure Brazilian economic growth for decades.

Citations

1. "Brazil." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 6 Feb. 2012.

2. International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. N.p.: n.p., 2011. IMF.org. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

3. The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power's Struggle with Geography. N.p.: STRATFOR, n.d. Print.

4.  Clemons, Benedict. The Real Plan, Poverty, and Income Distribution in Brazil. N.p.: IMF, 1997. Finance and Development. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

5. Pielow, Christian. "Brazil – A New Future." The Executive Search Blog. Blue Steps, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

6. "Filling Up the Future." The Economist 5 Nov. 2011: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

7.  "A Big Oil Discovery." The Economist 12 Feb. 2008: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

8. Shifter, Michael. "Argentina-Brazil Relations." World Politics Review. Trend Lines, 22 Dec. 2010. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

9. "Brazil reiterates support for Argentina, denies any blockade to the Falklands." MercoPress 1 Feb. 2012: n. pag. MercoPress South Atlantic News Agency. Web. 6 Apr. 2012. .

10. Varas, Augusto. Brazil in South America: From Indifference to Hegemony. N.p.: FRIDE, 2008. FRIDE. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.

11. "Speak Softly and Carry a Blank Cheque." The Economist 15 July 2010: n. pag. The Economist. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.

12. Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Luiz. "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations withthe United States." Latin American Perspectives 33.3 (2006): 12-27.JSTOR. Web. 7 Apr. 2012. .

13. Hakim, Peter. "Why the US and Brazil Can't Get Along – A Story of Turf, Ideology, and Interests." Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica (Mar. 2011): n.pag. Inter-American Dialogue. Web. 7 Apr. 2012.
14.  "Brazil News." The New York Times 7 Dec. 2010: n. pag. The New York Times. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

U.S. Navy and small craft: Part II

In my last post, I explained why small boats are not as big of a threat as many pundits claim. My post may have came across as categorically opposed to all small craft. That is not the case. Instead, I shall argue that small vessels have a big role in our modern Navy, and how they can best serve our fleet.

Previously, I showed how small craft are not particularly good at combating larger vessels. However, small boats are not limited only to harassing larger ships, they can serve some very important purposes as well. These roles have historically included tasks such as patrol of the littorals, fleet scouting, counter-piracy operations, acting as a courier, escorting ships, and interception of couriers. Of these, interception of couriers (particularly drug-running craft today) and counter-piracy operations are probably the most relevant today, since scouting and patrol of the coast are already handled by aircraft and the Coast Guard, respectively, and courier operations are more effectively carried out by invisible submarines or fast jets. Although escorting convoys is an important role warships must play, it is not particularly relevant in this time of global maritime peace.

These requirements for a small warship (counter-piracy and interception of drug-runners with a minor focus on convoy escorting) are further compounded by the nature of the modern U.S. Navy. The Navy operates around the world, which requires all of its boats, including so-called littoral craft, to be able to sail in the open ocean to reach far-flung crisis zones. Further, the wide variety of threats that the Navy faces means that any warship that Navy launches must be multirole.

In addition, the need for a small warship to counter-act the threats of piracy and drug running is immediate. The Navy regularly trumpets that it exists to further freedom of the seas, and right now, the only impediment to freedom of navigation is piracy. The Navy's current fleet, which was largely designed to defeat the Soviets, is wholly inadequate for this task: most Arleigh Burke destroyers are not even equipped with the helicopters or boats necessary for stopping pirate skiffs. Further, pirate craft (and by extension, drug running vessels, which are even faster than pirate vessels) have proven that they are capable of outrunning and out-maneuvering Navy ships. The Navy's huge, billion plus dollar destroyers are also far too expensive for the task of countering piracy or drug-running.

Of course, the Navy is always several steps ahead of me: the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, which has produced two rival ship classes: the Freedom class and the Independence class, has created vessels to address these needs. Although the two ships have received an unreasonable amount of hatred in both Navy circles and on the internet, I shall argue that they are the best boats we could have purchased, for their purpose.

The LCS ships are well suited to the tasks of countering piracy and drug traffic. Both are fast, clocking in at 47 knots for the Freedom and 44 for the Independence. This makes them the fastest ships in the Navy, and as fast as some of the boats they attempt to defeat. [1] Further, the ships are highly maneuverable: both are equipped with independently-steerable water jets, which allow the LCS to turn on a dime, an ability that has been demonstrated in sea trials. [2]. The ships are also seaworthy enough to make long voyages on their own, owing to their high stability in choppy seas [3] and their ranges of roughly 1,500 nm. [4] The ships are equipped with the latest detection equipment, and carry 1-2 helicopters as well as Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) for intercepting pirate, terrorist, or drug running boats.

What makes the LCS unique, however, is their weapons systems. Besides the usual weapons (a naval gun, machine guns, and a CIWS system) the ships are customizable, that is, their main armament can vary depending on the situation at hand, with customization taking less than 48 hours [3]. This allows the LCS to be a minesweeper one day, a subchaser the next, and an air-defense corvette the day after. This customization allows the LCS to fulfill its requirement of being multirole while avoiding the need to carry weapons of all types and thus be a jack of all trades: decent at everything but good at nothing. The success of customizable warships has already been demonstrated with the Royal Danish Navy's Absalon class support ships: large amphibious support vessels that have been used successfully in counter-piracy operations. [5].

Critics assail the Navy for not purchasing the excellent corvettes and patrol boats already on the market, an offense they say is particularly heinous since many corvettes and patrol boats are made here in the U.S. They further point to how useless the LCS would be if forced to fight warships from another nation. However, these arguments miss the point of the LCS: if the Navy wanted a corvette or a patrol boat, it would have bought one. Patrol boats are built to defend the coast (a task taken care of by the Coast Guard and Air Force in the U.S.), while corvettes are intended to fight in a fleet against other ships or land installations, in a manner similar to missile boats or torpedo boats. The LCS is supposed to be a fast counter piracy and drug running ship that can serve as an corvette or minesweeper in a pinch. The LCS is quick, maneuverable, and small (both in terms of overall size and draft), giving it the advantages of a patrol boat in combating small craft. At the same time, it is long range and powerful, giving it the advantages of a corvette. Finally, it has its own, unique advantages over other vessels: its capabilities are not as spread thin as those of a corvette because of its customizability.

In effect, the LCS is the perfect warship for its role. It saves money by taking the role of numerous other ships: minesweepers, fast attack craft, subchasers, patrol craft, etc. It excels in what it does because of its maneuverability, powerful armament, and speed. It can sail great distances in open seas to protect merchant vessels in times of war. And it fills a big gap in U.S. naval capabilities by providing an effective means of defeating fast speedboats and pirates.



Cites
1. http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0918/p05s01-woam.html
2. http://archive.decaturdaily.com/decaturdaily/news/060612/ships.shtml
3.Navy Littoral Comabt Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress. Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs. Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2011
4. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/
5. http://politiken.dk/indland/article691125.ece

U.S. Navy and small craft: Part I

Every few years, the naval brass fret about a new supposedly unbeatable threat to U.S. naval supremacy. In the late '90s, it was diesel-electric submarines. In the last decade, it was Chinese anti-shipping missiles. And right now, the fear of the moment is Iranian small craft. Much of this fear was sparked by a highly-publicized 2002 war game that predicted that the Navy would lose catastrophically in a battle with Iranian small craft. While the methodology of said war game is dubious (see my earlier post on Iran), something still needs to be done to improve the capabilities of the Navy in combating small craft.

It is always prudent to consult history, particularly here. Small warships are as old as naval combat itself, but until recently, small vessels were unable to challenge larger ships because they lacked sufficient stability and freeboard to sail in the ocean, as well as sufficient firepower to even dent the armor of larger vessels, they posed no threat to large surface combatants. This changed in 1866 by the invention of the torpedo, which allowed small boats to successfully defeat much larger battleships. The subsequent introduction of the torpedo boat in 1877 created a panic in naval circles since it was believed that swarms of torpedo boats would allow tiny nations to lay waste to huge, expensive fleets, forever upsetting the balance of power. However, as Mahan observed, these boats were akin to fire-ships in that they were effective at striking fear into the enemy but not very effective at sinking ships. Torpedo boats suffered from the same fates as earlier small craft, plus some new ones: they were dangerous in open waters, had short ranges, could only engage enemy ships effectively at short ranges (at which point they would be ripped up by low-caliber guns), and were too small to carry advanced aiming devices or range finders, a fault that doomed them to inaccuracy. Indeed, early torpedo boats were almost total failures: torpedoes boats in the Russo-Japanese war only sunk one ship that had already been rendered crippled and immobile by battleship fire, and improved torpedo boats in WWI still only sunk one cruiser in the entire war. The destroyer, originally built to defend fleets against the torpedo boat, had largely replaced the torpedo boat by WWI since destroyers were more seaworthy, had a longer range, carried better detection equipment and, most importantly, had guns and depth charges to provide adequate defenses against submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. This trend continued through WWII, where torpedo boats were hampered by increased fleet speeds (which denied torpedo boats the speed and agility advantage they had long relied on) and long-range patrol aircraft, which could detect and defeat torpedo boats before they even came close to an enemy fleet.

Postwar, small vessels again underwent a renaissance. The invention of the guided missile, coupling with the shrinking of electronics, particularly radar, gave rise to the missile boat, a type of fast, short range boat designed to sink larger ships with swarm tactics and then escape speedily. Some larger missile boats could even carry close in weapons systems (CIWS) to defend against enemy missiles and SAMs to protect against aircraft, which ought to have taken away the main liability of torpedo boats: their extreme vulnerability. Initially, it looked as if missile boats were the huge threats that torpedo boats were supposed to be. This is illustrated by several events, especially the famous sinking of the Israeli frigate Eilat by an Egyptian Osa-class missile boat in 1967; the destruction of four Pakistani ships, including a destroyer and two large merchantmen, by Indian missile boats in 1971; and the sinking of five Syrian missile boats by six Israeli missile boats at the Battle of Latakia (the first battle between two fleets of missile boats) in 1973. However, it must be borne in mind that in all three of these engagements, the losers were primarily obsolete ships that lacked defensive countermeasures. The effectiveness of countermeasures, particularly CIWS guns and missiles, has been well demonstrated: the successful use of electronic countermeasures and chaff by the Israelis at Latakia and the effective use of CIWS missiles to defeat anti-ship missiles by the Royal Navy in the Falklands War provide two good examples. Finally, missile boats are still extraordinarily vulnerable to attacks from aircraft and surface ships. To wit, NATO helicopters made short work of the Iraqi Navy's missile craft in the Gulf War, and the U.S. Navy destroyed three Iranian speedboats and one Iranian gunship with aircraft and ship launched missiles in Operation Praying Mantis while taking no casualties.

So the threat posed by Iranian speedboats may not be so dire after all. However, the fact that Iranian speedboats could potentially pose a threat means that the U.S. Navy must create a means by which to defeat this threat. A strategy for defeating Iranian missile boats must be both offensive and defensive: that is, the Navy must be able to both sink Iranian boats and defend itself against attacks by them.

The offensive aspect of fighting Iranian boats is mostly already taken care of. Combat air patrol can be expected to detect incoming Iranian craft and fire on them. However, because Iranian missile boats are small and fairly stealthy, they may be difficult to detect from high altitudes. Thus, it would be prudent to devote a small portion of a carrier's combat air patrol to low-altitude searches for Iranian boats. As the success of helicopter operations against Iraqi missile boats in the Gulf War demonstrates, helicopters can provide a valuable defense against missile boats. However, a helicopter is useless if it is not armed, so the Navy must have its anti-submarine and patrol helicopters carry some kind of light anti-ship missile such as the AGM-65 Maverick (I choose the Maverick because it is currently in U.S. Navy inventory and since its effectiveness against small craft was already demonstrated in the Gulf War) while in the Persian Gulf. Further, surface ships can effectively defeat missile boats using their light guns and anti-aircraft missiles. However, surface ships are useless if they do not detect Iranian craft, so it must be ensured that all Navy ships are equipped with the very latest sensors, and that these sensors are always on.

The main area of concern regarding Iranian missile boats is defense. U.S. Navy vessels are equipped with highly advanced CIWS and electronic countermeasures, which ought to provide adequate defenses against Iranian boats. All Navy ships ought to be equipped with these CIWS guns and electronic countermeasures (ECM). Some ships that currently carry CIWS and ECM ought to carry more of it, particularly the Arleigh Burke flight IIa destroyers (which only carry 1 Phalanx CIWS gun, and ought to carry 2 to give them protection fore and aft) and the Nimitz, Enterprise and Gerald R. Ford class carriers, which all could benefit from more CIWS guns and missiles located in more locations on the ships, to give the carriers 360 degree defensive coverage and redundancy in defenses so that if one CIWS system fails, another can take its place. Also, the U.S. Navy needs to avoid the fate of the INS Hanit (an Israeli corvette hit by a missile because she forgot to activate her countermeasures) and keep ECM and CIWS ready to use at all times, in addition to keeping sensors running at all times to ensure long-range detection of enemy combatants. Finally, to prevent "swarm" attacks, in which vast numbers of small boats overwhelm larger ships by forcing the latter to expend all of their defensive weapons on endless waves of boats, the Navy needs to upgrade all ships to carry AESA radar, which can track more targets than current radars can. Further, U.S. warships ought to carry more ammunition for all of their weapons in order to not get overwhelmed by large numbers of enemies.

Thus, the supposedly lethal threat of Iranian speedboats may not be so scary after all. History has shown that small craft never live up to expectations. The Navy currently has the means to defend itself against any number of small craft attacks, and it can be expected to do so in the event of a conflict. It is probably now time for the naval brass to start looking for the next unbeatable threat to naval supremacy.

It was ok to kill al-Aulaqi

There has been a lot of controversy lately surrounding Attorney General Eric Holder's speech in which he defended the Obama administration's killing of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi. Holder argues in his speech that due process does not imply judicial process, i.e. a trial, since judicial process is not specified in the Constitution. Although he is correct, since the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that due process is liberty, not judicial process, this is a highly unwise argument to make, since many Americans view due process as referring to judicial process. Holder regrettably ignored the many valid and popular justifications for the legality of the killing of al-Aulaqi.

One argument leveled against the Obama administration is that al-Aulaqi was merely a terrorist sympathizer, not a combatant, so his killing was not justified under the laws of war, which only permit the killing of enemy combatants. This calls for a little background information. Al-Aulaqi, a former radical Islamic imam and al-Qaeda propagandist, was also a direct planner of terrorist attacks. In the failed Christmas Day Bombing of 2009, al-Aulaqi not only advocated for the attack, but he helped plan the attack and supply the perpetrator. As RAND counter-terrorism expert Seth Jones said, "Al-Awlaki actually helped get him [the bomber] in a jihadi camp, helped him get access to the underwear bomb and then actually walked him through [it]. He wanted [the bomber] to wait to explode [the bomb] over American airspace." He further instructed the bomber on how to evade capture. In addition, Al-Aulaqi had communicated regularly with Maj. Nidal Hasan, the man responsible for the deaths of 13 U.S. soldiers at Fort Hood, and had not only encouraged Maj. Hasan to carry out the attack, he gave Maj. Hasan his personal blessing to carry out the attack. In the words of al-Aulaqi, "[I] blessed the act because it was against a military target." Going further back, one can see ties between al-Aulaqi and 9/11. In early 2000, al-Aulaqi met with several of the 9/11 hijackers, including Khalid al-Mihdhar, both al-Hazmi brothers, and one other unidentified hijacker. In February of that same year, al-Aulaqi made four calls to Oman al-Bayoumi, who assisted the hijackers, although the FBI is confident that Nawaf al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were using al-Bayoumi's at the time. Ominously, al-Aulaqi  After the attacks, al-Aulaqi admitted to the FBI of having met with Nawaf al-Hazmi several times, although he did not tell the FBI what they discussed.

Although the above is already a fairly damning implication of al-Aulaqi in terrorism, the acts detailed above are only those in which al-Aulaqi had a direct involvement. His indirect involvement, in the form of radicalizing Muslims and then inspiring them to do terror, has had a far greater impact: he inspired or aided the Times Square bomb plot, the 2010 British Airlines bomb plot, and the 2009 Little Rock recruitment office attack, to name a few. Although some claim that al-Aulaqi acted as a journalist or commentator when he advocated violence against Americans (in the same way that O'Reilly is considered a commentator instead of a combatant despite his calls for war with Iran), this claim ignores al-Aulaqi's direct involvement in inspiring people to kill (many terrorists have cited al-Aulaqi as their inspiration), his recruitment campaigns for al-Qaeda, the fact that he both advocates and plans terror in his speeches (one of his most famous pamphlets, 44 ways to support jihad, calls on Muslims to finance and join jihadi organizations and to undergo weapons training), and his membership in al-Qaeda. These facts, particularly the last one, mean that al-Aulaqi is more similar to a military recruiter, military chaplain, or senior officer than to a journalist. These clear ties to al-Qaeda make it hard to argue that al-Aulaqi is a civilian.

There is also the legality aspect. Critics of the killing of al-Aulaqi argue that it is illegal to kill a U.S. citizen without due process. However, because the U.S. is at war with al-Qaeda, al-Aulaqi's organization, al-Aulaqi is effectively an enemy combatant. U.S. law allows for the killing of the killing of enemy combatants regardless of their citizenship, so this killing was justified. Although it can be argued that the U.S. could just call anyone a terrorist and thus justify killing them, al-Qaeda is a serious enough threat to justify calling them an enemy, as Maj. Matthew Machon and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights explain, "Statman claims that the United States is entitled to classify operations against al-Qaeda as war...based upon two specific criteria: (a) the gravity of the threat posed by al Qaeda and (b) the impracticality of coping with this threat by conventional law-enforcing institutions and methods. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report on Terrorism and Human Rights in 2002 appears to agree[s] with the assessment of Statman." Maj. Machon is right on both fronts: al-Qaeda has killed over 5,000 Americans, and intimidation of juries and witnesses by terrorist groups plus the difficulty of finding 100% conclusive evidence of al-Qaeda membership makes trials of terrorists almost impossible.

Part (b), the impracticality of law-enforcement, applies particularly well to al-Aulaqi's case. His location in Yemen, deep in the heart of an al-Qaeda stronghold, would have made his capture difficult if not impossible. Trying al-Aulaqi would have just given him an opportunity to rant about his political beliefs for hours, and the fact that he is not a trigger-puller but a support-member in al-Qaeda would make him difficult to convict, especially since civilian courts have a tendency to clear terrorists of their charges (see: Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani).

Finally, al-Aulaqi will not set a precedent for killing Americans. In the U.S. Civil War, the Confederates were all former U.S. citizens, and yet they were killed. Indeed, some Northerners defected to the South, and yet some of them were still killed by Union troops. This precedent of the U.S. being allowed to kill Americans who try to destroy America has been around since 1861, and yet we have not been plunged into a fascist dictatorship. This proves that the U.S. only attacks organizations that pose a great threat to its security, and al-Qaeda is one of those organizations.

So to recap: al-Aulaqi was a confirmed enemy combatant who was directly responsible for several attacks on U.S. citizens and was indirectly responsible for the deaths of many others. His status as a combatant invalidates any claims he could have had to a civilian trial, and the impossibility of capturing him made the drone strike the only viable option.

One State in Israel?

Hamas fired rockets leave Gaza for Israel.

  
  There is a lot of debate in the media about what to do with Israel and Palestine. Terrorists and violent protesters in the West Bank and Gaza are fighting for Palestinian statehood, while Israeli security forces take actions to secure the safety of their citizens and their right to the area. The best solution to this crisis there would be to allow Israel to take over both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, since it would be a legal action that would help the Palestinians.

    First, the Palestinians have no right to the land. Legitimate rule is contingent upon the ability of the state to keep its people safe both from itself and from foreign powers. The fact that Israel is able to build all of its settlements in the first place without any action from the Palestinian Authority just goes to show that the Palestinian Authority is not strong enough to be considered the legitimate owner of the West Bank. The West Bank is governed by an ineffective and bankrupt state, the Palestinian Authority, that is unable to provide even the most basic health care and education to its people.1 The Palestinian Authority's corruption is largely self-caused, since poor relations between Hamas and Fatah caused the Palestinian Authority to become so bitterly divided between Hamas supporters and Fatah supporters that the government simply could not function. The Gaza Strip is governed by Hamas, which is classified as a terrorist organization by the State Department, and with good reason: it massacres its political opponents2, uses civilians as human shields2, and has dedicated itself to the destruction of Israel.

    In addition, there would be numerous benefits to allowing Israel to take control over the West Bank and Gaza. Israel is a modern democracy with functioning legal institutions, rights for women, halfway decent education systems, welfare institutions, and some basic civil liberties and rights3. Israel has a booming economy that is entrepreneur driven3, so a unification of Israel and Palestine would help lift Palestinians out of poverty. Although there is anti-Palestinian discrimination in Israel, discrimination in Palestine is as severe or worse, although it is directed at different targets. For example, enforcement of Shari’a in some areas of Palestine have caused women there to have virtually no rights4, and the disabled are discriminated against equally heavily5. Israeli security forces can provide real law enforcement, and could effectively defeat terrorists. An Israeli takeover would dramatically boost the Palestine standard of living, and give them freedoms that a Palestinian state would not be able to offer. It is thus not surprising that polls show that most Arabs in East Jerusalem who have experienced the benefits of Israeli welfare, education and health care want to live in Israel instead of Palestine.6

    Contrast this with Palestine. The Palestinian economy is nearly entirely agricultural, with some small industries, making it barely a developing nation. The main barrier to prosperity there is costly and limited access to capital thanks to government policies, and nearly all economic growth has been caused by foreign aid instead of private sector development. The Palestinian Authority, the government that controls Palestine, is swamped with debts, causing it to cut welfare and raise prices on things like power. Unemployment stands at 25% in the West Bank and 40% in Gaza, compared with 5.6%% in Israel.7 Health care in Palestine is a failure: infant mortality is high compared to the rest of the Arab world, treatable non-communicable diseases are the leading cause of death, and thousands of Palestinians are forced to seek health care in other nations due to the lack of health care in much of Palestine.1

    Thus Israel should take the Palestinian territories under her wing to rescue the Palestinian citizens from the oppressive regime of Hamas and the useless Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and raise them up to a modern standard of living.

Cites
1. Mataria, Awad, et al. Heath in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 5. N.p.: n.p.,
    2009. Print. 5.
2. Under Cover of War: Hamas Political Violence in Gaza. New York City: Human
    Rights Watch, 2009. Print.
3. Oren, Michael. "The Ultimate Ally." Foreign Policy. Washington Post, May-June 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. .
4. Facts on Violence Against Women in Palestine. Jerusalem: MIFTAH, 2005. Print.
5. Amro, Nuereddin. "From discrimination to an inclusive future for the visually handicapped in Palestine." Strong Voices. N.p., 6 Dec. 2011. Web. 10 Feb.2012. .
6. Diehl, Jackson. "Why Palestinians want to be Israeli citizens." Post Partisan.Washignton Post, 12 Jan. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. .
7. "West Bank." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 18 Jan. 2012. Web. 6 Feb. 2012. .